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  1Foreword 
 
This paper was written for the UK’s Department for International Development 
(www.dfid.gov.uk).  It is targeted at DFID – and other donor organisation – officials 
working with central banks, and aims to describe, in non-technical terms, what central 
banks are and what the appropriate role for them in developing countries might be. The 
final chapters looking at institution and capacity building, and donor co-ordination, 
reflect the target audience. 
 
Most of the CCBS Handbooks  and Lectures are available from our website 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/ccbs/handbooks_lectures.htm. Several have been 
translated into Spanish, Russian and Arabic, and these versions are also available on the 
website. 
 
Our aim is to continue to add to the series, covering new areas of interest and also 
updating existing Handbooks to take account of recent developments.  Some of the latest 
Handbooks will include econometric exercises developed in our workshops, thus making 
these available to a wider audience. 
 
We hope you find the new additions to the series useful, and would welcome any 
comments on the Handbooks and Lectures and any suggestions for future topics. 
 
We should note that all views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those 









Executive summary........................................................................................................... 4 
 
1.  Introduction: Why central banks matter for poverty reduction.................... 5 
 
2.  What is a central bank? ..................................................................................... 8
 
3.  Cash.................................................................................................................... 11
 
4.  Non-cash payment systems .............................................................................. 15 
 
5.  Monetary policy................................................................................................ 18
Central bank goals...............................................................................................18 
Data collection and  price stability .....................................................................19 
Implementation of monetary policy.....................................................................20 
Exchange rate targets..........................................................................................22 
A central bank’s scope for action........................................................................23 
Developing interest rate sensitivity .....................................................................25
 
6.  The financial sector........................................................................................... 27 
Supervision and stability......................................................................................27 
Infrastructure and financial market development ...............................................28 
Cross-border transfers.........................................................................................29 
Foreign banks......................................................................................................30 
Interest rate controls............................................................................................31 
International standards .......................................................................................31
 
7.  Financial inclusion............................................................................................ 33 
 
8.  Central bank governance and political economy........................................... 36 
Independence and accountability........................................................................37 
Internal organisation...........................................................................................39
 
9.  Central bank laws............................................................................................. 42 
 
10.  Institution and capacity building .................................................................... 45 
 
11.  Donor co-ordination......................................................................................... 47 
Disbursement of donor funds...............................................................................48 
 
12.  Summary and conclusions ............................................................................... 50 
Possible donor interventions ...............................................................................52 
ANNEX 1: Central Bank Goals ...........................................................................54 
ANNEX 2: Balance Sheet of a Central Bank.......................................................57 
ANNEX 3: Msanzi accounts.................................................................................59 
ANNEX 4: The Role of Commercial Banks .........................................................61 
ANNEX 5: Regional Institutions..........................................................................63 
ANNEX 6: Further reading .................................................................................66 
  3Executive summary
 
Central banks play a significant role in providing the macroeconomic context for 
development and poverty reduction.  Promoting low inflation and currency stability is not 
just IMF mantra; economic growth suffers as a result of high inflation or currency 
instability, with the poor and vulnerable the worst affected.   
 
Central banking in most countries aims to achieve monetary stability – a sound currency, 
with a stable exchange rate and/or low inflation – and financial sector stability – sound 
banks which provide good services without undertaking excessive risk, and an effective 
non-cash payment system.  
 
Most central banks deal with their governments (principally the Ministry of Finance) and 
commercial banks. They rarely deal with individuals. But the whole population will 
benefit from good central banking: good quality bank notes and low inflation are 
important directly to everyone; and it is typically the case that failure to deliver these 
harms most the vulnerable in society. Relatively small but well-targeted inputs to 
strengthen these functions may be one of the most effective forms of aid provision. 
Millions can benefit very rapidly from a few months of well-targeted advice. 
 
Financial sector stability and financial market development will normally take longer to 
deliver results than improvements in the area of monetary stability. But they can support 
sustainable economic growth, to the benefit of all. It is probably harder to ensure that 
financial sector development will provide direct benefits to the poor and vulnerable, as 
they may not be users of the services; and microfinance development is normally led by 
the government and commercial providers rather than the by central bank. But there are 
important areas for central bank involvement: banking supervision, microfinance 
supervision, and the development of widely-available non-cash payment services. 
 
Some of the areas which will provide real and rapid benefits, or target social inclusion, 
are not always the high-profile initiatives. For instance, developing economic and 
monetary policy understanding may produce few visible results quickly. A simple interim 
payment system may be able to operate quickly and at a small fraction of the cost of 
sophisticated systems. Microfinance may be less headline-catching than capital market 
development. It is important that donors should focus on and fund areas which will 
provide real benefits to the priority areas for the country.  
 
In all these areas, donor aid to central banks will tend to be policy-intensive. This puts a 
premium on good quality advice. The fact that good advice can constitute highly-
effective aid implies that weak advice can have substantial adverse consequences here. 
This paper aims to provide a broad understanding of what central banks are, focussing in 
particular on their functions in developing countries with a view to facilitating donors in 
targeting and monitoring effectively the provision of aid. 
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1   Introduction: Why central banks matter for poverty reduction 
 
What are central banks, and what can they do to improve the lot of the vulnerable in 
society? Is central banking relevant to the poor and vulnerable in poor and fragile 
developing economies? And can central banks in developing countries do anything to 
promote employment, or economic growth, or tackle poverty in other ways?  
 
Central banking in most countries – rich or poor - aims to achieve monetary stability – a 
sound currency, with a stable exchange rate and/or low inflation – and financial sector 
stability – sound banks (and other financial institutions) which provide good services 
without undertaking excessive risk, and an effective non-cash payment system. Helping 
central banks in developing countries to provide this sort of macro stability may be one of 
the most effective ways of providing aid. 
 
Good central banking should benefit the whole population – even in developing 
countries, where the predominant use of cash means that the interest rate has little direct 
relevance to most of the population (cash does not carry an interest rate); where there 
may even be a preference for another central bank’s notes (US dollars or euros for 
instance); and where the banking system may represent a closed door (literally) to the 
majority of the population in many developing countries.  
 
In developed countries, most people give relatively little thought to monetary or financial 
stability, because they have them – in the same way that few people think about the 
plumbing until/unless a pipe bursts. We tend not to worry about the impact of inflation on 
the timing of our decisions – at least since inflation has dropped to low and stable levels – 
since it is too low to make much difference. And bank failures – especially of large banks 
– are deemed so unlikely (and are in practice very rare) that they are not a matter of major 
concern. And while people may grumble that cheques take three days to clear, the 
payment systems are easy to use and reliable. To this extent, central banks may feel they 
have succeeded when the population does not think about them or what they do. The 
situation is different in many developing countries, and especially in the poorer countries, 
where inflation tends to be much higher, the banking sector more fragile, and the 
payment system rudimentary and often cash-based.  People will then tend to worry about 
the value of the domestic currency, and the reliability of the banks, or try to avoid using 
them altogether.  
 
As a rule of thumb, when inflation is high and volatile (the two normally go together), 
and the exchange rate unstable, there is a resource transfer to those in the population most 
adept at managing a difficult financial situation. This tends to mean that the rich get 
richer and the poor get poorer.  
 
“Inflation also tends to lead to an unequal redistribution of wealth to the benefit 
of the wealthy who can hedge themselves against inflation and to the detriment of 
the poor who have neither the resources nor the skills to protect themselves. In a 
real sense, central banks are there to protect those who cannot protect themselves 
against the vagaries of inflation.” (Tito Mboweni, Governor, Reserve Bank of 
South Africa.) 
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Where the financial sector is weak and/or inefficient, it does not provide the support 
needed for strong economic growth. A (currently unpublished) HM Treasury document 
on the reconstruction of post-war Iraq notes: 
 
“The … reestablishment of the financial system [currency, banking, and 
government budget] is necessary for the physical reconstruction to happen 
efficiently, and the design of a durable and robust framework for economic policy 
combined with a medium-term economic strategy is necessary for the physical 
reconstruction to be durable.”
1
 
Most central banks have limited visibility to the public: they undertake transactions only 
with commercial banks and do not, as a rule, provide any services direct to individuals. 
But by providing a large degree of certainty in the value of money and in the financial 
system, building trust and promoting efficiency, central banks can help to create a stable 
basis on which the economy can develop, to the benefit of all. This stability can be 
especially important to the less financially-sophisticated members of society, who often 
do not have an effective choice nor the means to protect themselves against monetary or 
financial instability.  
 
This paper does not rigorously categorise countries into groups such as developing, 
emerging market, poor, post-conflict. Such groupings can gloss over important 
differences in structure and history; and the application of any reform programme must 
be individualised to each country. It does focus on low-income and post-conflict 
countries, rather than middle income countries which may already have reasonably well-
developed central banking. The conclusions suggest some broad approaches to 
prioritisation and sequencing, although it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide 
detailed recommendations here. That said, some of the key sequencing issues include: 
 
•  Is the currency stable or not – in terms of the exchange rate and inflation? If not, 
then stabilisation should take priority over the development of the financial 
infrastructure for a currency which the population may be trying to avoid using.  
•  Similarly, if poor fiscal behaviour or other instability are still stoking inflation, 
there may be little point in replacing poor quality bank notes, since new notes 
may rapidly become devalued. 
•  If the economy is largely cash based, the jump to a state-of-the-art electronic 
payment system is probably too big. An interim, less sophisticated system which 
can be introduced much faster and more cheaply should be explored. 
•  Is the political and security situation perceived to be a significant risk? If so, there 
is unlikely to be much demand for large corporate loans and efforts to promote 
this sector may be futile. But micro-lending could still be effective. 
•  Is the banking sector fragile? Better to improve banking supervision and put the 
banks onto a sound footing before encouraging the population to keep their 
savings in banks rather than under the mattress. 
                                                 
1 “The vital first step for a post-war economic strategy is to implement a currency reform rapidly. Without 
sound money, transactions in the Iraqi economy will be impaired, and development will be postponed.” 
Steve Hanke and Matt Sekerke, “Monetary options for post-war Iraq”, September 2003. 
 
  6•  Is economic growth constrained by the lack of credit provision or by its cost? 
How can the central bank support financial sector development without taking on 
a commercial or development banking role
2? 
 
Most developing countries have a shortage of human resources skilled in central banking. 
It makes sense to focus effort on priority areas, and on areas when the effort is likely to 
reap results, while at the same time developing something of a vision for the central bank. 
The long march starts with the first step. Waiting until the situation is better before 
planning for the long-term may mean waiting forever. 
 
The following sections look at the various functions of central banks which are most 
visible to the public, and then issues internal to the central bank (but which are necessary 
to support its main functions). While the paper concludes that there are things which 
central banks can do to promote sustainable economic growth, reduce poverty and 
support the provision of financial services to vulnerable groups, it argues that they can do 
so most effectively by doing what central banks do best – providing good quality 
currency and keeping inflation low (monetary stability)
3; reducing the risk of bank failure 
(financial stability); and supporting non-cash payment systems
4. The attempt by central 
banks to micro-manage other aspects of the economy (perhaps by non-market 
mechanisms)  almost always fails
5, and tends to be detrimental to market development, 
with a longer-term impact on monetary and financial stability, and on economic growth
6. 
 
That is not to say that direct efforts to promote employment, to provide seed finance to 
entrepreneurs, to prevent unfair competition harming the vulnerable and so on are not 
laudable aims. Indeed, the East Asian experience might suggest that central banks can 
usefully pursue certain developmental goals directly (supporting or subsidising lending to 
priority sectors, for instance). However, this paper argues that while it may have been 
effective in particular a political and cultural context, these are not aims which central 
banks can usefully pursue directly: they are most efficiently and reliably undertaken by 
development banks with a clear remit, rather than mixing the function with the delivery 
of monetary policy. Where central banks try to act as development banks, it tends to be to 
the detriment of functions which they can and should fulfil. 
                                                 
2 Section 2 expands on the development banking function. 
3 “… it is important to understand what monetary policy can do and what it cannot. … monetary policy 
cannot ensure that output will grow at a constant rate. But in the medium term it can deliver low and stable 
inflation. In that way, it provides a platform for … businesses throughout the country … to make the long-
term decisions that are the source of our prosperity.” Governor Mervyn King, 11 October 2005. 
4 The link with poverty reduction is made, inter alia, by the World Bank in a September 2005 press release 
on the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process in 
Honduras. It lists six important areas, which include central banking functions: monetary and financial 
stability, and payment systems. 
5 “…the [forced] application of stabilisation securities penalised banks that could mobilise more deposits 
than others, while the use of credit allocation and interest rate ceilings perpetuated distortions which 
resulted in the misallocation of resources, moral hazard and adverse selection.” Dr O J Nnanna, Central 
Bank of Nigeria in ‘Foreign currency inflows, surplus liquidity and sterilisation techniques: lessons from 
Nigeria’, 2005. 
6 Even if one accepts that growth is not always pro-poor – eg Joseph Stiglitz’s criticism of trickle-down 
growth  in ‘Globalisation and its discontents’, 2002 – the benefits from greater monetary and financial 
stability accrue whether or not they are accompanied by more economic growth. 
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2   What is a central bank?   
1.  What is a central bank? 
 
There are a range of functions which are commonly undertaken by central banks. A Bank 
of England study in 1995 looked at five key areas: monetary policy (eg setting interest 
rates or the exchange rate); financial sector stability (eg banking supervision); 
government debt management; the wholesale payment system (eg acting as banker to the 
banks); and a branch network (including banking operations).   
 
The chart below indicates which of those functions the Bank of England performed in 
1995 and in 2005. A point close to the centre of the chart indicates little or no 
involvement, while one at the edge of a spoke indicates full involvement. There are major 
differences, flowing from the decision by the Labour government early after the 1997 
elections to move both banking supervision and government debt management to 
separate entities (the Financial Services Authority and the UK Debt Management Office 
– an agency of the Treasury - respectively), and to give the Bank independence in the 












Bank of England 1995-2005
 
One clear conclusion from the changes is that there are few functions which central banks 
must undertake fully in order to qualify as central banks. As a broad generalisation, 
central banks often start out being engaged is most or all of the above five functions and 
over time strengthen their position in the core areas of monetary policy and payment 
systems, while shedding other responsibilities to different institutions
7. Any description 
of the role of central bank, whether in general or specifically in low income countries, 
must therefore involve an element of ‘normally’ or ‘usually’: it should not be too 
                                                 
7 Some central banks view banking supervision as a core function. 
  8dogmatic. Annex 1 details the goals set by law for a selection of central banks around the 
world. 
 
One important function which is omitted from the chart is that of note issuance. There are 
some quasi-central banks which do not undertake this, or a related function of operating 
as banker to the commercial banks; they are sometimes called Monetary Authorities (eg; 
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority; the Luxembourg Monetary Authority prior to its 
pre-euro transition to central banking status; or the Palestinian Monetary Authority).  For 
some economies – for instance, economies which adopt another country’s currency 
(Kosovo, Montenegro which use the euro) - this may be appropriate. 
 
In developing countries, most central banks have a broad range of responsibilities. 
 










Initially, most developing country central banks will undertake all of the six functions 
(note issuance plus the five in the chart) – the solid blue line above – but while notionally 
responsible for setting interest rates, there may be important Ministry of Finance 
involvement here (whether explicit or implicit); and there must be at least some Ministry 
of Finance involvement in government debt management. In some of the more advanced 
developing economies the functions of banking supervision and government debt 
management may be moved into separate institutions, though often retaining some role 
for the central bank; but it is also more likely then that central bank autonomy in setting 
interest rates will improve. This potential shift is indicated by the dotted red line. A wide 
range of combinations is, of course, possible. 
 
Historically, some central banks have pursued ‘development’ goals, whether implicitly or 
explicitly, and some would argue that, in a developing market context they still should, 
for instance, Gerald Epstein, “Central banks as agents of economic development”. Where 
the activity relates to monetary stability (eg the gold standard in the UK in the 19
th 
century), and financial stability (good supervision), this ‘development’ goals are met by 
focussing on core central banking, as defined here. Where it relates to directed lending – 
for instance, differential reserve requirements or obligatory investments (practiced in 
Italy post-war) – the practice may or may not be successful; but is arguably a non-
  9transparent and inefficient way of running a development bank. Development banks 
should have a clear goal; and if funded at market rates or by the government budget, it is 
clear what they cost, allowing the government to undertake an informed cost-benefit 
analysis. But if it is operated by holding interest rates low or directed lending, the cost is 
not clear, and financial market development tends to be impeded. It is true that there were 
elements of direct controls in the UK post-war, in fitting with the general thrust of 
economic management; but also arguable that this approach damaged not only financial 
market development, but the economy as a whole. Development banks – whether 
regional or sectoral – can be effective; but some are hugely inefficient and prone to 
abuse. In any case, it is not central banking. 
 
The subsequent sections of this paper will review the role of note issuance, before 
moving on to look at payment systems, monetary policy and financial stability. It will 
touch on branch networks, particularly in the context of their use in underbanked 
economies; and on government debt management, with the caution that involvement here 
can create conflicts of interest for central banks, especially in developing markets. 
 
What is important to policy makers is not always the same as the issues as perceived by 
the man or woman on the street. For most of the latter, the key functionality required 
from the central bank may be the provision of a reliable currency for transactions 
purposes, and – particularly in developing economies - a degree of exchange rate 
stability. From the banking system more widely, the provision of a network of secure 
locations for cash storage, and of a simple non-cash payments system, will be important.  
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3   Cash   
 
Money is traditionally viewed as having three broad functions: it is a means of payment 
in transactions; it is a store of value; and it is a unit of account. These functions are 
essential to an economy if it is to move much beyond the stage of barter; and it is easy to 
see that if money does not fulfil these functions well, then it will be more difficult for a 
complex, efficient economy to develop.  
 
Cash  may be the most visible manifestation of the central bank. Most countries have 
their own currency, though many developing countries are also likely to operate with a 
second currency (normally US dollars, but the euro eg in some of the Balkan states).  
 
Often, minting of coin is the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance (Treasury) rather 
than the central bank; and it is unusual for the central bank’s name to be on coin. But for 
the purposes of this paper, coin are not treated separately to notes, as they tend to have a 
much lower value, are not viewed separately by the public, and do not have a different 
economic function. 
 
Many central banks no longer print the notes that they issue. The Bank of England sold 
its printing works to the private sector in 2004; and commercial printers such as the UK’s 
De La Rue print notes for the majority of countries worldwide. This is sensible: 
economies of scale mean that it is cost-effective for most countries to buy notes from a 
commercial supplier rather than produce their own (and see section below on 
counterfeiting risks). But this does not affect the central bank’s role as sole legal issuer of 
currency.
8 Domestic currency notes are a liability of the central bank (see annex 2 on the 
central bank’s balance sheet), regardless of who prints them. 
 
An important argument in favour of currency exchanges in a number of recent post-
conflict countries – Afghanistan, Iraq, Timor Leste – has been that a weak currency 
discourages economic development, and creates an atmosphere of instability and 
uncertainty which affects everyone
9; and in largely cash-based economies, poor quality 
banknotes (with increased likelihood of counterfeiting) can easily equate with a weak 
currency. The benefits of a stable currency are noted inter alia by Jeff Sachs in the UN’s 
recent “A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals”
10: 
 
“… the private sector needs a supportive macroeconomic framework. 
International and domestic macroeconomic stability minimizes uncertainty for 
businesses. Businesses cannot dependably buy inputs or sell their products 
internationally when the local currency is unstable against other currencies— or 
if the country is experiencing high inflation with constant readjustments of prices 
and a loss of confidence abroad.” 
                                                 
8 In most countries there is only one legal issuer of notes. There are exceptions – such as the Scottish and 
Irish banks which can issue their own notes, albeit within strict constraints imposed by the Bank of 
England. This links to the question of legal tender, a technical point not further pursued here. 
9 In August 2003, the municipal workers in Baghdad went on strike when they were offered salary 
payments in dinar rather than dollars. 
10 http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/fullreport.htm 
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Similarly, “The most important single macroeconomic factor that is a necessary 
precondition for development is a stable domestic currency which is widely accepted by 
domestic households, banks and firms.”
11
 
In this light, how is the domestic currency of a country viewed? Is it trusted? And in 
particular, do people fear that it will lose value because of the risk of counterfeits? 
Locally-produced currency will tend to be of poor quality and relatively easy to 
counterfeit.  
 
If the domestic currency is not trusted, then economic agents will seek to use an 
alternative – hence the degree of ‘dollarisation’ in many developing countries
12. This 
does allow the economy to side-step some of the risks associated with a weak domestic 
currency, but at a cost. It weakens the role of the central bank as issuer of currency, and 
at the extreme will remove its ability to conduct monetary policy. And dollarisation is 
often associated with a high level of cash usage, which is inefficient, hampers trade 
(particularly between different regions), and means that savings are not available for 
lending to potential borrowers (because they are under the mattress rather than deposited 
in banks). Moreover, when a foreign currency is used, the seigniorage revenue
13 which 
accrues to note-issuing central banks goes to the US Fed or the ECB (typically) rather 
than the national central bank.  
 
The risk of counterfeiting is substantial in countries with cheaply-produced notes. Good 
quality notes will typically be on specialist cloth-based (rather than wood-based) paper; 
and will have a range of security features which may include intaglio printing (some of 
the lettering or numbers can be felt), metallic thread; watermarks; optically-variable ink; 
and some features which are machine readable but not detectable by normal users.  
 
In some countries, particularly when there is a recent history of conflict, there may be a 
parallel semi-official currency or currencies. For instance, in Afghanistan some warlords 
printed their own notes, with no real backing; but these were accepted as legal tender in 
the currency exchange which unified the currency. Somalia and Sudan face similar 
issues. In some countries a group which has taken charge of part of the country has 
occasionally persuaded external printers of the currency to provide more, in an 
inflationary manner. It is not always clear whether such notes should have the same status 
as previously issued notes; but for most of the population they may be indistinguishable. 
In any case, the emergence of multiple issuers and uncontrolled printing of money is 
always inflationary and destabilising. 
 
If it is hard to distinguish genuine central bank notes from forgeries or those of dubious 
legal position, it will again tend to be the vulnerable groups in society which suffer most. 
The rich get richer and the poor get poorer. And in both cases, the resources diverted to 
                                                 
11 “Beyond the Washington Consensus: Macroeconomic Policies for Development”, Herr and Priewe, 
Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 2005.  
12 For instance, some Latin American countries in the 1980s, and some of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) 
countries in the early 1990s experienced very high inflation, resulting in a large degree of dollarisation. 
13 The revenue gained from investing funds raised by selling non-interest bearing liabilities (cash and most 
central bank balances). If there is no domestic currency, the central bank has no non-interest bearing 
liabilities to sell. 
  12inflation and counterfeit protection could be better spent on areas of real benefit to the 
economy. 
 
•  Risk of counterfeiting – the only very short-term solution to widespread (fear of) 
counterfeiting may be to switch into foreign currency. This is only a partial 
solution, because the smallest denominations of USD bills and euro are often 
much larger than small transactions values in the country
14; and the foreign 
currency needs to be paid for and brought in. Printing a new domestic currency, 
out of country, is possible (good quality machinery will not be available 
domestically); but will take at least three-four months even if old designs and 
plates can be used (but with appropriate security features) and could easily be two 
or three times as long. 
 
The cost of replacing a currency can be high. In the euro area it was estimated as perhaps 
0.4% of GDP. In a developing country, the figure could easily be 1% of GDP. On the 
other hand, the costs of not doing so can be much larger. It has been deemed worthwhile 
in a number of LICUS
15 countries – Afghanistan, Timor Leste for instance – and in the 
next few years quite possibly in Somalia, Sudan and others. 
 
There may be side benefits of a currency exchange, if there is a banking network in 
existence to support it (this was not the case in Afghanistan, and would not at present 
happen in Somalia). Where a large part of the population is ‘un-banked’, advantage can 
be taken of the need to go to banks to exchange cash, for the banks (including Post Office 
banks, if they exist) to sell their services – for secure deposits, payment transfers, perhaps 
small loans (the un-banked are unlikely to be looking for large loans); and this could 
boost usage, and so development, of the financial system. 
 
As well as the quality of the notes, appropriate denominations are important. In Iraq, one 
of the reasons for the currency exchange at end 2003 was the inadequacy of existing 
denominations for everyday use. The largest note, for instance, was ID10,000 – worth 
about USD4 at the time the decision was taken to introduce a new currency. Even if the 
physical quality of the notes is good, a recent history of hyperinflation may have reduced 
the value of the notes significantly. The Democratic Republic of Congo, which 
experienced hyperinflation in the late 1990s
16 raised the highest denomination note from 
F100 to F500 in 2005, but even the new note was worth little more than USD1. 
 
  This is worth less than the paper it is printed on. 
 
 
The wrong denominations are not just a matter of inconvenience – needing a suitcase 
instead of a wallet. In the DRC, it affected use of the banking system: the central bank 
could not print sufficient volume of notes for banks to meet demand, so that bank 
balances began to trade at a discount to cash as they were not easily accessible; and this 
                                                 
14 Other currencies are unlikely to be both available and acceptable. 
15 Low Income Countries Under Stress – information available on the World Bank website. 
16 Cumulative inflation from 1999-2001 was around 3,340%. 
  13discouraged use of the banking system. It also meant an increase in dollarisation, despite 
a huge measure of success in bringing down inflation (to single digits in 2003). 
 
Distrust of the domestic currency can also arise from: 
 
•  Printing too much money – normally because the government ‘borrows’ from the 
central bank, increasing cash in circulation without increasing the supply of goods 
and services. This can in principle be stopped by a change to the central bank law 
(see section 9); but in a transitional period it may be necessary to turn a blind eye 
to small amounts of monetary financing (for more on monetary financing, see box 
in Section 5); and unless government expenditure is to be cut back or revenue 
increased sharply – which may be disruptive – an alternative source of funding for 
government expenditure is needed when moving from monetary financing.  
 
•  Excessive demand for foreign currency – in a post-conflict situation, and in many 
transitional countries (especially post hyper-inflation), the local currency is likely 
to be undervalued
17. But some people will nevertheless want to switch into 
foreign currency because of the uncertainties still associated with the local 
currency. There is little that the central bank on its own can do about this in the 
short run – unless it has a sufficient supply of foreign currency which it can 
provide to the market. If it does this, it is important as far as possible to do so in a 
fair and transparent way (to increase certainty and counter the scope for 
corruption). The foreign exchange auction in Iraq may be a useful model.  
 
The two points above – the risks of inflation and devaluation – are covered in more detail 
later under ‘Monetary Policy’ (section 5). 
                                                 
17 High or hyper inflation can lead to a loss of trust in the issuer which may take years to regain. 
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4   Non-cash payment systems 
 
Non-cash payment systems include cheques, direct credits and direct debits, and debit 
cards (credit cards may need to be approached more cautiously because of the credit risk 
involved). They can substantially reduce the security risk of transporting large amounts 
of cash around a country in a possibly unstable environment
18, and in any case are much 
more efficient from an economic point of view. Some developed countries still use cash 
for relatively large expenditures, for instance buying cars (Germany has one of the 
highest levels of cash usage in payments in Europe); but few would want to make 
commercial payments in cash. Yet in some countries there is no reliable alternative, with 
payments to the value of millions of dollars being made in cash. This clearly adds to the 




Another important benefit of non-cash payment systems is that they create an audit trail 
for income and expenditure. Corruption and theft of state funds in particular, and money 
laundering, become much harder. In many countries this alone would more than justify 
the expense of building a non-cash payment system
19 – but may also explain the 
slowness of their introduction in some countries. This would affect both high-level 
acceptance – do management want to maintain opportunities to hide transactions? – and 
lower-level usage (will bank staff prefer to take cash and leave some people with no 
record of their transactions?). 
 
                                                 
18 Government and NGOs in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, parts of the DRC and Sudan, for 
example, make sizable use of cash and have to pay high costs for physical transportation and for security 
(in Iraq, some quotes are up to 8% of the value of the payment). 
19 For instance, in Iraq the cost of setting up a secure communications network at 80 locations around the 
country, and paying the first year’s fees for use of an embedded payment system was around USD2 million. 
Government expenditures are in the region of USD 18 billion a year. The benefits of a good audit trail 
could pay for the system very quickly: reducing corruption by the equivalent of 0.01% of government 
transactions would pay for the system in one year, quite apart from the other associated benefits. 
  15Even if a non-cash payment system is put in place, it is quite likely that the most 
vulnerable groups will not have bank accounts and will make no or only minimal use of 
such systems. But they will benefit indirectly. For instance, if better systems reduce the 
scale of theft of state funds, more will be available for other purposes including poverty 
alleviation. And some marginal groups will be able to use the non-cash systems. 
 
The core payment function for a central bank is to act as banker to the commercial banks, 
allowing them to make non-cash transfers between each other, and with government, 
across the books of the central bank; and providing short-term liquidity as necessary to 
support the smooth flow of these payments.  
 
In the early stages of financial sector development, however, it may be sensible for the 
central bank to play a broader and direct role in the payment system, not only settling 
balances between banks, but using its branch network – most developing country central 
banks have a substantial nationwide branch network – to provide access to non-cash 
payment transfers to non-banks as well
20. It should be possible to encourage commercial 
banks to start providing non-cash payment services at an early stage. Initially, it may just 
be a few bank branches in the capital, or in major cities, and providing such services only 
for high-value payments. This is a very useful start: it should allow the banks to get used 
to the systems (if they are not already familiar with them); and if they are seen to work, 
demand will grow and the system can be expanded. As it expands, cash holders will have 
more incentive to deposit money with banks, allowing the country’s savings to be used 
productively; and it will be possible to start developing the interest rate mechanism (see 
section 5). 
 
It is possible to set up a basic electronic secure payment system quite quickly (using 
laptops and satellite/radio communications
21); but this should initially be targeted only at 
large value, low volume transfers. This will allow people (bank staff, businesses) to get 
used to the concept and deliver useful reductions in cash transfers without overloading 
the new system with a large number of transactions. Everyone should be allowed to use 
the system from the start; but if there is no history of such a system the cultural change in 
moving to a non-cash system – even issues such as accounting in the commercial and 
central bank’s books for non-cash transfers – is substantial. It is easier to persuade 
companies to use the new system for low-volume, high-value transactions, and then use 
the success of this to attract a growing number of users, than to persuade a large number 
of low-value transactions into a new system from the start. 
 
In some countries, NGOs can be slow to make use of available systems, persisting with 
cash transfers in foreign currency when domestic non-cash systems could be used. In 
Afghanistan, a US army officer took the initiative of promoting use of Afghani and the 
central bank’s branch network to facilitate payments; but when NATO took over some of 
the US army functions, many payments were made in euro cash. Iraq has seen similar 
                                                 
20 As an extreme example, the central bank in post-war Afghanistan has more branches than all the 
commercial banks together, and far greater geographical coverage. Until the commercial bank branch 
network expands – and this could take years – there is a good case for the central bank to support the 
payment system, both wholesale and retail, via its own branches – as indeed it is doing. 
21 A payment system is essentially a secure communications system, with standardised formatting to 
facilitate the handling of a large number of transfers. Small volumes can be handled with a minimum of 
standardisation. Indeed, Malta reportedly uses a spreadsheet for its Real Time Gross Settlement System, as 
it works with a handful of commercial banks, transacting only a handful of payments each day, and all 
based within a small geographical area. Complex systems are not always necessary. 
  16behaviour, with many NGOs flying in USD and paying high costs for its transportation 
around the country to recipients who then move it back abroad, when the whole of the 
payment chain could have been conducted electronically. In difficult operating 
environments it can be easy to ‘justify’ high operating costs, and it can be hard to find out 
how to use more efficient alternatives. This may point to the need for service providers – 
central banks and commercial banks – to promote the use of non-cash systems more 
effectively. 
 
There may be teething problems in a switch from cash to non-cash systems. Where cash 
is used, a government or NGO payment is often accompanied with the physical 
movement of the requisite amount of cash to wherever in the country it is needed. If the 
payment is made electronically – for instance, salaries are credited to bank accounts, or a 
contractor’s account with a local bank is credited – the local bank branch (whether central 
bank or commercial) will need to have a certain amount of cash available, though quite 
possibly not 100% of the amount transferred. In a developed market, banks have a 
reasonable idea of their net daily cash requirements, and if necessary can obtain more 
quickly. Cash movements are not related to individual payment orders. But where there is 
less use of the banking system – for instance where bank branches are used for 
distributing cash, but little flows back - and where usage is developing, it is harder for 
bank branches to forecast cash requirements. There may then be a temptation initially still 
to link each payment transaction to a physical shipment of cash. But in time cash flow 
management should become a branch responsibility, rather than something that is 
managed centrally by the central bank, and this should allow for a reduction in cash 
shipments. 
 
More sophisticated retail electronic payment systems, such as credit and debit cards, and 
availability of ATMs, may not exist at all, or only in very limited areas. These will not be 
a priority for development, not least because they require reliable and extensive secure 
communications systems to operate, as well as customer and point-of-sales familiarity. 
That said, ATMs can provide some of the benefits of electronic transfers to many of the 
poorest in society (see for instance Annex 3). In South Africa, pensioners can use a smart 
card to withdraw their monthly payments from ATMs. In rural areas, ATMs are 
sometimes put on trucks which are driven around the villages, allowing cash to be 
disbursed even in villages with no electricity, and with a minimum of bureaucracy and 
cost. While central banks would not normally be involved directly in the development of 
such a system , except as regards oversight of commercial banks and payment systems 
(financial stability functions) – ideally commercial banks should do this – they could 
certainly promote their use. 
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5   Monetary policy 
 
Central bank goals 
 
Most modern central banks have as their goals something on the lines of “to support 




“Whatever other factors influence the inflation rate, one can hardly deny that the 
execution of monetary policy in pursuit of price stability is a core function of 
central banks in all modern economies. The credibility of central banks depends 
to a large extent on whether they are perceived as either consistently applying 
monetary policy in a fair, dynamic, flexible and socially responsible manner or 
whether they are perceived as institutions staffed by arrogant, narrow-minded 
unelected bureaucrats.” 
23   
 
A number of central banks have additional (normally subsidiary) goals -  to support 
financial sector stability, and to promote an efficient payment system. In many countries 
there will be additional, general goals of promoting economic growth, and specific tasks 
relating to directed lending and subsidised lending to particular sectors. The goals of 
promoting economic growth and employment are of course worthy; but it is not clear 
what specifically the central bank can do to promote these directly, other than as part of 
its remit to support monetary and financial sector stability, and payment system 
efficiency. While in the very short-term there may be conflicts between monetary 
stability, on the one hand, and supporting economic growth, employment creation etc on 
the other, in the medium to long-term (and sometimes even in the short-term) there is no 
such conflict. Good monetary policy supports sustainable growth; bad monetary policy 
does the opposite.  
 
For instance, if the central bank itself lends to ‘priority’ sectors, this will impede the 
development of private sector commercial banking, expand money supply in a potentially 
inflationary way, and involve the central bank in credit risk. If it pushes the commercial 
banks to lend at below market rates, then it will tend to discourage saving (if banks cut 
deposit rates in order to protect profitability) or damage the banks’ capital (if they make a 
loss); weaken the proper role of credit assessment and pricing; and divert resources from 
more productive areas. Holding interest rates too low is more likely to result in less 
investment and more inflation than would otherwise be the case
24, and does not benefit 
the vulnerable in society. 
 
                                                 
22 The legally-imposed goals for a selection of central banks are detailed in Annex 3. 
23 Tito Mboweni, Governor of the Reserve Bank of South Africa, August 2004. 
24 It may help to think about savings and investment in terms of resources. Investment can occur when 
production (plus net imports) exceeds short-term consumption needs. The ‘surplus’ resources, whether 
labour or physical goods, can be used for investment. Interest rates can help to allocate the resources; but 
lowering interest rates or printing more money does not increase the amount of real resources available.  
  18Whether or not the law governing the central bank states its goals as being to assure price 
stability or something wider, the actual goals pursued by the central bank are just as 
important. In some countries, especially where there is strong political interference with 
the conduct of monetary policy, there is a perception that while weak monetary policy 
might allow more inflation, it is better for growth and employment. This is fallacious. But 
while this is demonstrable statistically
25, many central banks and governments are 
tempted to believe that they are “different”. 
 
“It is usually desirable for countries to have a defined strategy, or anchor, for domestic 
monetary policy. The nature of this anchor may differ…Of the three broad types of 
anchor, exchange rate targeting may be appropriate in the early stages of 
stabilisation….Monetary targets have advantages when the demand for money is stable 
[not common in developing markets]…Inflation targets have proved effective when the 
financial structure and central bank credibility are developed enough to be a stabilising 
factor in the formation of expectations. In all cases, however, the policy anchor will be 
successful in achieving low and stable inflation only if the authorities are willing to 
follow through with the necessary policy decisions, both in the realm of monetary 
policy and in the realm of fiscal and structural policies.
26” 
 
Data collection and price stability 
 
Central banks need data to measure whether they are achieving their goals, or at least 
moving in the right direction. If price stability is the goal – as is virtually always the case 
– it is clear that data on price movements is essential. But it is quite possible that good 
data on domestic inflation is simply not being collected; or in some extreme cases that it 
never has been collected; or that many goods have been subject to price controls
27, so 
that official inflation data does not reflect the prices many people really pay
28. Countries 
with inflation-targeting regimes can adjust the targeted index to take account of 
distortions caused by controlled prices; and may for instance exclude items subject to 
potentially-large increases because of changes in taxes and duties (tobacco, alcohol, 
petrol). But it may take some time before there is a reasonable statistical basis for 
measuring inflation, and longer before it is readily understood and trusted.  
 
The meaning of price stability will vary from country to country. In most developed 
countries, a recorded inflation level of around 2% is generally understood these days as 
being close to zero in real terms, as indices are assumed to overstate the level of inflation 
by failing to take full account of improvements in quality of output. But while all 
countries might aim for this in the long term, it is not always a realistic target for this year 
or the next. A country with a recent experience of hyperinflation, or simply with a history 
of inflation of 20% or more a year, might regard achieving a level of 5% as a major 
success. And if there is a need for substantial economic restructuring, or price 
                                                 
25 Fry, Goodhart and Almeida 1995 cite statistics showing a negative correlation between inflation and 
economic growth, and quote a range of earlier papers in support. 
26 Andrew Crockett, in “Monetary Policy Frameworks in a Global Context”, Routledge, 2000 
27 Controlled prices are not, of course, affected by monetary policy but, rather, respond to administrative 
decisions, which may keep them too stable, or result in sharp hikes. 
28 When there are price controls, it is common that there is only a limited supply of goods available at the 
official price, but additional supplies at a (much higher) market price. 
  19liberalisation, or where there is a sudden and substantial inflow of donor aid, inflation 
may be much higher for a period
29. 
 
Where data quality and availability is poor, the statistics office or the central bank could 
start by collecting rudimentary data, on a regular basis – possibly even just in the capital -  
to obtain at least some information. Does it matter which body collects data? The ideal is 
an independent statistics bureau (like the UK Central Statistics Office) to collect data, to 
avoid any possible clash of interests eg if the central bank is targeting inflation but also 
drawing up the measurement. But in some developing countries central banks retain a 
statistics gathering function because of concerns about the quality of data available from 
the statistics office. Data collection should not be proliferated, however. If several groups 
all collect data, and produce different results (whether because of methodology, location, 
choice of sample etc), the picture could become confused. Better to have one group 
producing basic sample data, and use additional resources to support the Central Statistics 
Office in improving the production of a reliable, nationwide data series. 
 
Where resources are scarce, the central bank will need to prioritise in its data collection. 
The starting point is to ask why it needs data. The need should drive the prioritisation, 
and the capacity/possibilities of collecting should inform it. For instance, exchange rate 
data is of fundamental importance; and it should be easy to collect it daily, though if 
market prices vary between different areas, times of day, volumes transacted etc 
collections methods may benefit from some refinement
30. Balance of payments data can 
be very useful in support of exchange rate management; but are normally extremely hard 
to collect with any accuracy. A proxy might be obtained by producing the central bank’s 
balance sheet regularly, with an accurate valuation of foreign exchange assets and 
liabilities. Broad monetary aggregate data can give a useful picture of economic 
developments, but relies on accurate and timely reporting by the banking system, which 
may take months or even years. Narrow money aggregates can be obtained easily from 
the central bank’s own balance sheet, but should be treated with care. Just because the 
data is easy to collect does not mean it can be relied on in guiding policy. The three areas 
where donors can most obviously support central banks are (i) in the collection and 
‘cleaning’ of data (staff need to know how to handle anomalies); (ii) in the prioritisation 
of which data to collect, and with which frequency; and (iii) in the analysis of data (many 
central bank ‘research and statistics’ departments simply pass on numbers, without 
analysis or presentation in a form which management can easily use. 
 
Implementation of monetary policy 
 
A central bank’s tools to control inflation essentially rest on its ability to set a price for 
money – normally either a short-term (eg 7-14 days maturity) interest rate, or the 
exchange rate. In many developing markets, it is the latter which is the most powerful, as 
                                                 
29 Price level adjustments of this sort need not be a problem, provided they do not lead to an inflationary 
mentality eg in wage claims.   
30 Some central banks are reluctant to collect the street market rate, viewing it as a 'black market'. This is 
wrong. In many developing countries, changes in the market rate may be the best economic indicator 
available. 
 
  20the interest rate mechanism in the economy is weak. For instance, if the economy is cash-
based, and the main borrower in the formal financial sector is the government, changes in 
interest rates will not be nearly as effective in changing agents’ behaviour as in developed 
market economies. A recent IMF paper notes:  
 
“The advantages of exchange rate flexibility increase as a country becomes more 
integrated into global capital markets and develops a sound financial 
system…Conversely, in developing countries with limited access to private 
external capital, pegs and other limited –flexibility arrangements have also been 
associated with lower inflation, without an apparent cost in terms of lower growth 
or higher growth volatility.
31” 
 
This section therefore deals largely with exchange rate policies, as these are most likely 
to be relevant to poor and fragile states. This section does also point to the need to plan 
for development of other options. The IMF paper again: “Case studies from middle-
income countries with open capital accounts show that the fear of floating can be 
overcome by an investment in learning to float”. As poor countries aspire to become 
richer, they will need to plan for any changes in monetary policy required to support this 
development. 
 
Note also that central bank instruments which can affect the price of money are a 
necessary but not sufficient condition to control inflation. Responsible fiscal policy is 
also essential. Consider three examples: 
 
•  In post-war Iraq, the government has sizable income from oil sales (particularly 
given the current high world price of oil); and in circumstances of social unrest 
and political manoeuvring, it is unsurprising that ministers want to spend the 
money available. But in some areas this is increasing demand excessively, and in 
combination with supply constraints result in inflation. The exchange rate is stable 
and there is no monetary financing; but demand pressures push up inflation. 
•  In Russia in 1998, the government’s fragile fiscal position led to budgetary 
collapse when the world oil price fell (in part a response to weak demand in the 
Far East after the Asian crisis in 1997). The government defaulted on its domestic 
debt and the ruble depreciated sharply, with a consequent jump in inflation. 
•  In the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2004, a deteriorating security 
situation in the east of the country resulted in a sharp increase in government 
expenditure, which was financed by forced central bank lending. A combination 
of money expansion and political uncertainty saw a weakening of the exchange 
rate and jump in inflation. 
 
 Although central bank financing of the government was not a novelty in the DRC, it 
must be unlikely that the existence of sound legislation would prevent a government in 
such circumstances from resort to monetary financing. Other central banks have faced the 
same issue eg the National Bank of Georgia in the 1990s. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
also has a history of lending to the government. 
 
                                                 
31 “Evolution and performance of exchange rate regimes”, Ken Rogoff et al, IMF Occasional Paper 229, 
2004 
  21Monetary financing  This term refers to central bank lending to the government; the 
phrase ‘printing money’ is occasionally used instead, though it does not need to involve 
literal printing of notes. The term can be difficult to define precisely. Indeed, the 
European Maastricht Treaty, in prohibiting it, does not use the term itself but instead uses 
the means by which it may happen. It prohibits central banks from providing overdraft or 
other credit facilities to their government, from purchasing government securities in the 
primary market, and from purchasing such securities in the secondary market other than 
for monetary policy purposes. 
 
How does monetary financing work? If government expenditure exceeds revenues, and 
the government is not prepared to pay the market interest rate for borrowing to cover the 
financing gap, then it will typically borrow from the central bank. Whether the central 
bank provides an overdraft or purchases government securities at above market price, it 
will credit the government’s account at the central bank. When the government spends 
the money, either the funds will be transferred to commercial bank accounts (eg because 
the government pays a supplier which uses a commercial bank), or the government will 
take physical cash and spend it (eg in salary payments). If the population and/or banks 
then hold excess money (central bank liabilities), they will try to spend it, or to purchase 
foreign exchange. Both of these typically lead to higher inflation. 
 
It is possible for governments to use a small amount of monetary financing without 
significantly boosting inflation. But it is hard to establish any long-term benefits from 
small amounts of monetary financing, and in many cases governments fail to exercise 
restraint in using it. It can easily become endemic. 
 
Exchange rate targets 
 
For most people in developing countries, the single most visible and important financial 
figure is the exchange rate; and there will be a reasonable expectation that if the nominal 
exchange rate is stable against a major foreign currency, that this will help to deliver 
domestic price stability at least for traded goods, and preserve the value of savings held in 
domestic currency. The street-market exchange rate may be visible, comprehensible and 
real in a way that inflation statistics are not.  
 
The exchange rate regime itself is normally chosen by the government, even if the central 
bank is responsible for day-to-day management. For example, the choice of exchange rate 
regime (eg new EU members joining the euro area) would clearly be for government; but 
the government would not be expected to interfere in the exchange rate path on a regular 
basis. That said, the government’s fiscal approach may constrain the options available to 
the central bank. 
 
“In many cases, the choice of exchange rate regime itself is determined by fiscal 
exigencies. Fiscal discipline enables greater choice of exchange rate regime, 




                                                 
32 “Central banking in developing countries”, Fry, Goodhart and Almeida, Routledge 1996 
  22For instance, if a government resorts to monetary financing, so pushing up inflation, the 
consequent impact on expected exchange rate depreciation will likely remove the policy 
option of exchange rate stability. Indeed, some commentators recommend currency 
boards
33, or even full dollarisation, where they believe the domestic institutions (ministry 
of finance and central bank) are too weak or inexperienced to manage monetary and 
exchange rate policy for themselves. A currency board system removes the possibility of 
monetary finance as well as any scope for discretionary monetary policy action. This 
places more of a burden on fiscal policy, since (i) the Ministry of Finance must now rely 
on market borrowing (or a balanced budget); and (ii) demand management within the 
economy will rely on fiscal adjustment. Monetary aggregate targets are also used where 
there are doubts about the ability to manage a more discretionary monetary policy. 
 
It is important to distinguish between the official exchange rate (if there is one) and the 
market – street market, or black market – exchange rate, if there is a difference between 
the two. The central bank cannot guarantee to keep the market exchange rate stable 
unless (i) it has sufficient foreign exchange reserves readily available (this might mean 
net foreign exchange assets roughly equal to the value of domestic currency in circulation 
plus banks’ balances with the central bank); or (ii) interest rates can be adjusted 
sufficiently to protect the exchange rate (there are limits to this); or (iii) it is lucky. It does 
not make sense to announce a policy of exchange rate stability if the central bank has to 
rely on luck to deliver (not least since such an announcement could well encourage 
speculative attack). If this means increased (voluntary) dollarisation of the economy 
because of continuing exchange rate volatility for a while, so be it. Trying to oppose such 
a trend administratively is unlikely to succeed, and may distract attention from other 
areas. 
 
A central bank’s scope for action 
 
At its weakest, a central bank might be able to monitor the market price for foreign 
exchange, but not even to influence it. This is still an important role, since it provides 
information to the central bank; and it can be useful for the central bank to publish a daily 
quotation for the exchange rate, and if possible for standard buy-sell spreads. At its 
strongest – a currency board arrangement – the central bank can determine the exchange 
rate, and by trading with banks and other large financial institutions can ensure that the 
market price for foreign exchange is in line with the target rate. Most central banks in 
developing markets are somewhere in between, being able to influence, but not to control 
the rate
34.  
                                                 
33 In a currency board arrangement, the exchange rate is fixed against an anchor currency, and the central 
bank cannot lend to government, and can only issue domestic currency liabilities – whether cash or 
commercial bank balances with the central bank – to the extent they are fully backed by holdings of foreign 
exchange reserves. This means the central bank can guarantee to hold the exchange rate, since at the 
extreme it can afford to buy back all of its liabilities for foreign exchange. 
34 Not all central banks want to control or influence the exchange rate, of course. 
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The People’s Bank of China is close to the currency board position, holding the exchange 
rate against the USD stable (although formally it has a floating exchange rate): it has 
large and growing foreign exchange reserves, and is able to hold the nominal exchange 
rate very stable against the US dollar. There is a cost to holding large foreign exchange 
reserves, since the central bank will need to drain excess domestic currency liquidity 
created as a counterpart; but as long as it is prepared to pay the cost – which will tend to 
be a mix between paying interest to the commercial banks (the PBoC issuance of bonds 
increased strongly in 2004, for instance) and higher inflation – the PBoC can keep the 
nominal exchange rate stable. The strong political authority of the government is no 
doubt helpful here; but even so it would be much harder to keep the market rate stable if 
there were pressure for the renminbi to depreciate, rather than appreciate. And to the 
extent strong demand and excess liquidity in the economy result in higher inflation than 
in the USA, the real (inflation-adjusted) exchange rate will appreciate anyway. 
 
 
In some cases, the central bank cannot enforce the exchange rate it would like to see, and 
resorts to an official exchange rate at which it will transact in limited volume with certain 
counterparties, forcing some – eg state-owned exporting companies – to sell foreign 
exchange proceeds and on-selling it at the same rate to privileged counterparties
35. This 
does not protect the interests of the population
36 – most of whom will have to use the 
street market rate for any transactions – but instead constitutes a reallocation of wealth, 
normally to a privileged elite. In some cases, it is a fairly blatant mechanism for enriching 
the privileged. This was the case under past regimes in, for example, Iraq, Nigeria and the 
former Soviet Union. 
 
The central bank’s transactions in the foreign exchange market should normally be 
transparent; and where possible they should be conducted in such a way as to reduce 
short-term volatility. The introduction of a foreign exchange auction, managed by the 
central bank, can be very helpful in delivering this, especially where the foreign exchange 
market is thin. It provides a clear and transparent market-based exchange rate – which 
can be publicised eg on the radio, in newspapers – and can allow the re-channelling to the 
market, via the central bank, of foreign exchange provided by donors or foreign exchange 




Assuming the exchange rate policy is to keep a broadly stable exchange rate, but not 
completely fixed against an anchor currency, the central bank needs to decide what 
degree of stability to aim for (or alternatively, what degree of volatility is acceptable, and 
when it becomes damaging). This can be a particularly difficult issue for countries where 
                                                 
35 If the difference is small – eg Egypt until 2002-03 – this may represent a distortion and inconvenience 
more than anything else; if large – eg Nigeria in the 1990s – it can cause severe distortions and 
inefficiencies. 
36 The IMF paper on Evolution and Performance of Exchange Rate Regimes (2004) notes, interestingly, 
that “macroeconomic performance…was weaker in countries with dual or multiple exchange 
rates…suggesting important gains from exchange rate unification.” 
37 The direction could be the reverse. In Russia, some of the dollar earnings by the private sector from oil 
sales need to be sold to the central bank to obtain the rubles required for domestic expenditure (including 
tax payments to the government). Either way, a mechanism is required to handle large flows. 
  24there is a strong seasonal or cyclical pattern to foreign exchange flows. For instance, 
large inflows during a coffee harvest (eg in the Honduras
38), or large tourism income will 
cause a seasonal pattern. Primary product exporters may face substantial cyclical swings 
as the world price for the raw materials which they export changes. Central banks can 
offset some of the exchange rate volatility by building up foreign exchange reserves 
when exports are strong, and running them down at other times, so smoothing the 
provision of foreign exchange for imports.  
 
Similarly, governments can smooth expenditure, when revenues are seasonal or cyclical, 
by setting up a stabilisation fund, or by improving budgeting and cash management. This 
will make the central bank’s task of monetary control much easier. But while this can 
work well in relatively wealthy countries (many oil exporting countries have such 
stabilisation funds), it can be politically much harder to justify them in poor countries. 
 
A related issue is the impact of exchange rate changes on the budget. If a government 
receives income in or related to foreign exchange, an exchange rate appreciation will 
mean it has less domestic currency to spend than would otherwise be the case.
39 If it has 
to make payments on foreign debt, exchange rate appreciation will make this cheaper in 
domestic currency terms, and vice versa. This risk of increasing the budgetary cost of 
servicing foreign debt sometimes encourages governments to push for exchange rate 
stability even when macroeconomic factors would point to a depreciation. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that even if a central bank is able to deliver exchange rate 
stability today, it may not be able to do so tomorrow; and that even if exchange rate 
stability is appropriate today, it may not be tomorrow. At some point, it may be important 
for the exchange rate to change – in either direction – and a broad policy of stability 
should not lose sight of the need to re-evaluate the policy from time to time. Argentina 
and Russia both benefited from exchange rate stability in the early 1990s, but both 
suffered from maintaining it for too long, when economic and particularly fiscal 
developments made it unsustainable. 
 
Developing interest rate sensitivity 
 
It is important for an economy to be able to respond to changes in demand in a non-
inflationary way: this will involve a combination of monetary and fiscal policies. 
Economists use the term ‘transmission mechanism’ to describe the way in which 
monetary policy impacts on the economy. In many developing economies, the exchange 
rate channel is the strongest part of the transmission mechanism. But exchange rate 
management has only limited power. Under a stable exchange rate regime, if demand for 
generators or medicine increases, more can be imported and the price should not change. 
But if demand for housing or offices or skilled labour jumps, supply can only respond 
with a lag, and prices will rise in the interim – regardless of how stable the exchange rate 
                                                 
38 This may be crop specific. Bananas are harvested all year round; opium in Afghanistan is seasonal. 
39 This can provide an element of countercyclical smoothing: if the exchange rate is appreciating because of 
high prices for the country’s exports, the government’s increased foreign exchange earnings may be offset 
by exchange rate appreciation, and vice versa, allowing a more stable level of domestic expenditure while 
the exchange rate and central bank reserves take the strain. 
  25is. As the economy matures, the central bank will need to place more weight on interest 
rate channels – whether interest rates predominantly affect consumption, as in the UK; or 
investment, as is more common in continental Europe. 
 
The central bank may have some interest-rate based monetary instruments available; but 
in many developing economies, interest-rate signals have only limited effect. The central 
bank should spend some time planning the future introduction of interest-rate based 
instruments, even if this is not an immediate priority. At the extreme, in communities 
below the poverty line where there is no scope for savings, interest rates are an 
irrelevance. But in all but the poorest economies there will be a certain level of savings – 
often held in foreign exchange, or domestic currency cash, or maybe even in physical 
goods (whether gold or everyday goods). If the financial sector can attract some of those 
savings, by providing services (eg payment services, and security) as well as paying an 
interest rate, then the savings can be mobilised to fund productive investment by other 
sectors of the economy. If the savings cannot be attracted, it will be harder to make loans. 
 
It is useful for a developing country central bank to consider how to develop interest rate 
sensitivity in its economy, and not just wait for it to happen  – not simply because this 
will give it a lever to influence inflation and (short-run) domestic demand, but because 
the development of market interest rate, and the economy’s awareness of and response to 
them,  will help in resource allocation in the economy. This development cannot happen 
in isolation. People who are not used to operating bank accounts are unlikely to start 
using banks in order to earn 2-3% real return. But if their salary is paid into an account 
(when the payment system and banks can support this), they may leave some cash there if 
interest is paid, and will start to appreciate the costs and benefits of the timing of 
consumption decisions. Banks will not pay interest if they cannot earn it, or if they have 
more deposits than they can use; so the central bank must be able to mop up any excess 
liquidity, and if the central bank or Ministry of Finance issue domestic currency 
securities, it is important that they pay a sufficient rate of return for the banks to be able 
to pass something on. 
 
What of the poorest groups in society? If inflation in traded goods is low as a result of 
exchange rate stability, but property prices rise, the poorer sections of society may not be 
affected significantly. If the exchange rate is allowed to rise to offset nominal property 
inflation, employment could suffer while consumer prices for traded goods may not fall 
(there may be a downwards stickiness of prices). Central banks need to consider the 
impact of any actions to offset inflation; and will benefit from being able to use interest 
rates as well as the exchange rate, since the impact on different areas of the economy will 
vary. 
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5   The financial sector 
 
Supervision and stability 
 
Financial sector stability might be defined as effective and efficient intermediation of 
savings and investments, by intermediaries which do not undertake excessive risks. 
Financial sector stability cannot be guaranteed at any stage; but this may not present a big 
problem in the early stages of market development – not because it does not matter per 
se, but because in emerging markets banks tend to be very risk averse (though not 
necessarily effective or efficient in other ways).  
 
That said, many countries have weak banking systems. Good quality banking supervision 
cannot be introduced quickly (any more than good quality banks), certainly not in a few 
months. This points to making an early start to capacity building – a useful and important 
area for donors to focus on. It also makes sense for supervisors to pay special attention to 
new banks which grow rapidly: they are often associated with corruption and subsequent 
collapse, and undermine efforts to develop use of financial intermediaries. (Examples in 
recent years would include Albania, Algeria, Kenya, Zambia.)
40
 
Any state-owned banks (they are prevalent in many developing economies) will almost 
certainly benefit from an implicit government guarantee. But it is not normally 
practicable to introduce formal deposit protection schemes into developing markets early 
on: until banking supervision, and the quality of audits and accounts etc, are sufficiently 
good, deposit protection schemes can be prohibitively expensive. Any state-owned banks 
are therefore likely to dominate the market for deposits, and thus for certain assets types 
(government securities) for some time, even if their balance sheets are weak. 
 
An early assessment of such state-owned banks should probably focus not on an accurate 
valuation with a view to privatisation (they cannot easily be sold quickly
41), but on an 
assessment of management and systems capability, local knowledge (though local 
knowledge may be unreliable), and useful functions. For instance, if state-owned banks 
have the largest branch networks, closing them might deprive many areas of any form of 
banking altogether; and this is a gap which new private banks are unlikely to fill for some 
time (because the profit opportunities of setting up branch networks in poor areas of the 
country will be very limited). Sometimes there will be a call for recapitalisation of weak 
state-owned banks. These should normally be resisted. Recapitalisation does not make a 
bank stronger: its management and credit skills are not magically enhanced. It just makes 
it more expensive for prospective purchasers, should privatisation be possible later; and 
may even encourage more lending by management lacking credit-evaluation skills. 
 
                                                 
40 “An active policy to supervise financial institutions is needed if financial liberalisation is not to lead to 
financial collapse, which invariably ends up by using tax revenues to write off bank loans were made to the 
relatively rich” – John Williamson, “Did the Washington Consensus Fail”, November 2002. 
41 Rapid privatisation in Russia is seen by many as a low-price transfer of state assets to a privileged few, 
with minimal benefits to the government. 
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way that private sector banks can grow, relative to the state-owned banks, at least by 
eliminating or reducing any in-built bias in favour of the state-owned banks. For instance, 
if legislation requires government bodies to use state-owned banks, it will be hard for 
private sector banks to expand some areas of business. Or if state-owned banks are 
allowed to hold less capital than private banks, or benefit from implicit deposit protection 
which does not extend to private banks, or do not need to earn profits, private banks 
cannot easily compete. Morocco is an example of state-owned bank dominance being 
eliminated by allowing the private sector banks to grow; this is probably more efficient 
and less painful than trying to close or to rehabilitate or sell the state-owned bank, and 
much better for the economy. 
 
But there may be a tension for the central bank between promoting financial sector 
development, and encouraging use of the banking system (for salary payments, for saving 
etc) – which should support faster economic growth – and recognising the fragility of the 
system, especially before supervision is well established. What if the banks collapse and 
some of those who have been encouraged to use the financial system, in spite of their 
reservations, lose money? If the central bank steps in to safeguard the interests of 
depositors, it exposes itself to moral hazard. If it does not, there may be a widespread loss 
of confidence in private banks. There is no easy answer to this dilemma: it reflects real 
difficulties and risk/reward choices in developing the financial sector. 
 
Infrastructure and financial market development 
 
The benefits of a strengthening financial sector are noted in the UN’s recent “A Practical 
Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals”. 
 
“… the private sector requires functioning, competitive markets for both inputs 
and products. Well-developed financial markets, which channel resources to 
entrepreneurs, help reduce the cost of and increase the access to capital. In many 
countries, the formal banking sector needs to be strengthened through regulatory 
reform and increased accountability of financial institutions.” 
 
A 1995 study on central banks in developing countries
42 noted that: 
 
“Rather than acting as primus inter pares, the typical developing country central 
bank dictates the terms and conditions under which other financial institutions 
may operate. Partly as a consequence of this role, central banks in these 
countries have assumed an enhanced responsibility for fostering the structural 
development of their financial systems…At least until very recently, market forces 
were fragile or even nonexistent in many developing countries, in part due to 
financial repression.” 
 
The position remains true for many developing country central banks. They may face a 
market failure, to the extent that functions typically carried out by the private sector in 
OECD countries (see Annex 4 for more detail on the normal roles of commercial banks) 
are not provided in their markets, and there is then a legitimate role for the central bank to 
                                                 
42 “Central banking in developing countries”, Fry, Goodhart and Almeida, Routledge 1996 
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sector at a later stage (not dissimilar to the way the Bank of England took on board the 
task of building CREST, the UK securities settlement system, in response to market 
failure. CREST was later sold to the market). When doing so, central banks will often 
face a difficult task in balancing on the one hand the need to be involved to provide some 
form of market infrastructure, and on the other hand the risk that by filling the gap, it may 
be harder for the private sector to step in later on.  
 
The benefits of non-cash payment systems are noted above (section 4). There are other 
areas of payments and cash transfer which may be important to an economy, but where 
central banks in developed markets would not be involved. 
 
Cross-border transfers  
 
In many developing countries, remittances from abroad are important both in macro 
terms (helping to support the balance of payments) and in micro terms (supporting 
individual families). But in the absence of a developed infrastructure, this can be difficult, 
slow and expensive. 
 
In many countries, such transfers are handled by the informal sector, known in some 
regions as Hawalla. The remitter in the developed/rich country makes a payment transfer 
to a local agent who has a contact in the country of residence of the recipient, and is 
given a code word or number to pass on. The agent (Hawalla operator) telephones his 
contact in the relevant country
43, who will provide cash to the beneficiary who knows the 
code word. Often funds are available within a few minutes or hours.  The Hawalla system 
is often much cheaper than more formal routes, via such companies as Western Union, 
Global Currencies etc. This reflects two factors: they typically have lower overheads and 
profit margins, and they are sometimes used for money laundering (so that the remittance 
work may be a ‘loss-leader’).  
 
How should central banks respond to this? There is increasing global pressure to prevent 
money laundering, so that some central banks want to encourage cross-border transfers to 
be channelled through the formal sector in a way that can be monitored (covered later in 
this section under ‘Standards’). But there is also a reluctance to squeeze out informal 
systems which are very efficient and provide a good and affordable service to the 
population. Interestingly, the IMF took the view in Afghanistan that the Hawalla system 
should not be discouraged, as it was the only effective cross-border (and internal) funds 
transfer ‘system’ available.  
 
The balance can be struck in different ways. In the short-term, central banks can licence 
the hawalla/foreign exchange dealers (the two tend to go together). This should not be in 
a burdensome way, as if they were banks: they should not be taking deposits, and so need 
not be subject to the same capital requirements
44. But it does give an opportunity to 
request data periodically (eg monthly aggregate turnover data), which can provide 
valuable information to the central bank; and daily data on the exchange rate and spreads 
in the market, and to inspect the market (for instance, to require that dealers are clear 
                                                 
43 Even in some poor countries this happens via electronic communication eg parts of Somalia. 
44 Some money transfer regulations require the posting of guarantees to cover the risk of payment failure. 
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approach which is not too onerous, while taking appropriate account of the risks involved 
(no deposit taking and no loans reduces risks compared with banks), should mean that 
most dealers will seek licensing rather than go underground or stop trading.  
 
In the longer-term, it may be more efficient for cross-border transfers to be brought into 
the formal system (whether through banks or other entities), where they can be 
automated. In Afghanistan, the central bank has made an agreement with a commercial 
bank whereby the commercial bank will offer to collect remittances in the Gulf region 
(where there are many Afghani ex pat workers) and remit them to Afghanistan at a fixed 
fee of USD6 (rather less than charged by hawalla dealers, especially for larger amounts). 
As the commercial bank does not have a branch network in Afghanistan, it can use the 
central bank’s branch network to distribute money as necessary around the country; and 
the interim payment system recently installed should allow the process to be automated 
sufficiently for the fee to (just) cover costs. While it is unusual for a central bank to 
provide retail payment services, in this case it makes sense, since it has the only branch 
network available. In time, as the private sector expands, the central bank should be able 
to withdraw from this function.  
 
In the USA and Latin America, commercial banks have, similarly, been encouraged to 
provide simple and cost-effective remittance services to workers in the USA sending 
money back home. This also meets the desire to channel flows into the formal sector, and 
so reduce the scope for money laundering, but to do so by providing an efficient service 
rather than by forcing closure of an informal system if there is no alternative for the 




Should foreign banks be allowed into the market? In some countries, legislation bars 
foreign banks, or allows them only to operate subsidiaries (rather than branches, whose 
activities are much harder to control). The proponents of exclusion sometimes argue that 
the domestic banks need room to develop before foreign banks are allowed in, as the 
latter would simply overwhelm small and/or inexpert domestic banks by their size, their 
expertise, and probably their better credit rating. On the other hand, the existing domestic 
banks may not be able to provide the services needed by the economy for rapid (or any) 
growth.  
 
This issue arose in Iraq in 2003, when the draft new commercial bank law proposed to 
allow entry of foreign banks, with no discrimination; and to raise the minimum capital for 
all banks to 10 billion dinar (around USD5 million at the time), a significant increase for 
the 15 or so private banks which had capital ranging from 0.5-2 billion dinar. But the 
existing commercial banks acknowledged that they could not provide large loans, or 
efficient cross-border services to their customers, and that it was better for the Iraqi 
economy to have the services available than to wait until the small banks grew. 
Moreover, they realised that their existing branch network and local knowledge would be 
valuable to incoming banks, and that co-operation with, or even outright sale to, foreign 
banks was also in their interests.  
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central Europe, North Africa and Central America – is that allowing in foreign banks is 
beneficial to the economy; and that a more dynamic and responsive financial sector 
facilitates monetary policy implementation and financial sector stability. In some cases, 
the foreign banks have purchased existing state-owned banks, using the staff and 
infrastructure but changing senior management and culture. This has happened, for 
instance, in Poland; and China is reportedly interested in selling some of its state-owned 
banks to foreign institutions. By contrast, preserving the market for new domestic 
institutions can have the opposite effect if rapid growth is followed by collapse, loss of 
savings and a new-found distrust of the private banks. 
 
Interest rate controls  
 
A number of central banks operate interest rate controls, or ensure the provision of 
subsidised finance to ‘priority’ sectors.  
 
•  Low rates for priority sectors: some governments declare certain sectors of the 
economy to be ‘priority’ sectors – perhaps manufacturing, or export sectors – and 
the central bank may then mandate a low, subsidised interest rate for commercial 
bank loans to them. Faced with this, commercial banks will tend to avoid lending 
to these sectors, or where possible will cut deposit rates in order to preserve profit 
margins. In any case, it is not easy to define such sectors clearly; and ineffective 
for central government to try to determine which areas of the economy will use 
available finance most efficiently.  
 
•  Minimum rates on customer deposits: these are occasionally imposed, supposedly 
to ensure that customers get a reasonable return. But if the rate is set above market 
levels, then in practice banks will tend to refuse to accept customer deposits. For 
instance, in Iraq prior to interest rate liberalisation in early 2004, banks would 
open current accounts for some customers as the official rate for these was 0%; 
but simply would not accept term deposits, where the rate was set too high (at 6-
8% depending on maturity). Some would have been willing to pay 2-3% to 
customers, but faced with a choice of 0% or 6%, chose the lower. 
 
However tempting, interest rate controls are ill-advised and ineffective, in that they tend 
not to deliver the (officially) desired results. In general, holding down lending rates 
effectively holds down deposit rates, and so reduces the amount of saving in the 
economy. Less real saving means a reduced amount of funds available for investment: 
this is not what developing countries need. Such controls may sometimes be imposed for 
misguided reasons; and sometimes because they are a route for providing well-connected 
groups with cheap funding. 
 
Moreover, using monetary policy tools for micromanagement of the economy tends to 
weaken monetary policy and so increase instability in prices and the exchange rate. 
International standards 
 
There are international standards and codes which the banking supervisor should aim to 
introduce and implement. A good starting point is the Bank for International Settlements 
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together with the “Core principles methodology” in October 1999 (see 
www.bis.org/bcbs/publ_06.htm). The Core Principles identify 25 basic principles which 
the BIS suggests need to be in place for effective banking supervision to be delivered. 
They relate to: 
 
•  Preconditions for effective banking supervision - Principle 1 
•  Licensing and structure - Principles 2 to 5 
•  Prudential regulations and requirements - Principles 6 to 15 
•  Methods of ongoing banking supervision - Principles 16 to 20 
•  Information requirements - Principle 21 
•  Formal powers of supervisors - Principle 22, and 
•  Cross-border banking - Principles 23 to 25. 
 
An example of the specific national approach to standards can be found in the UK FSA’s 
Handbook (www.fsahandbook.info/FSA/index.jsp). 
 
Other international standards are not necessarily banking-specific, for instance, 
international accounting standards (IAS). But in some developing markets full 
implementation may not be realistic in the near future, however desirable. When some 
banks have difficulties pulling together a balance sheet at all, requiring the use of new 
accounting standards may just be wishful thinking.  
 
Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML-CFT) 
measures may be more important, if only because the international community will often 
insist on their adoption as a prerequisite of aid. But however reasonable, it is important to 
be aware of tensions which may arise between a desire to develop the financial sector, 
and a desire to comply with international AML-CFT. For instance, the developed country 
‘know your customer’ standards may be hard to implement in a country where many 
potential customers lack a passport, employment in the formal sector, and may never 
have received a letter to evidence their address. The membership of the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF – www.fatf-gafi.org) does not include a single African country. This 
is not to say that African countries do not care about money laundering; but their 
priorities, and what they can realistically commit to, may not fit in easily with or be taken 
into account by the FATF agenda.  
 
A recent World Bank paper (Focus Note no. 29, July 2005) suggests some ways in which 
AML concerns can be tackled without an unintentional adverse impact on the 
disadvantaged. 
 
South Africa provides one example of how a country’s AML/CFT regulations can 
be modified to take into account better the needs of low-income clients. Customer 
due diligence regulations which require an income tax number and proof of 
residential address for clients proved too stringent to allow many low-income 
people to open bank accounts. Often low-income clients have no tax number and 
are unable to produce third-party verification of address. The South African 
authorities have now adopted a more flexible approach to client identification 
and verification and introduced a compliance exemption that relaxes 
requirements for a category of clients known as “mass banking clients”: those 
clients with small balances and small size transactions. 
  327   Financial inclusion 
 
The foreword to ‘Promoting Financial Inclusion” (HM Treasury, 2004
45) says:  
 
“Tackling financial exclusion is the responsibility of financial services providers, 
working in partnership with the Government and the voluntary and community 
sector. Working together we can empower individuals to take control of their own 
finances, access basic financial services and break free of unmanageable debt.” 
 
Where there is an existing banking network, the commercial banks can be encouraged to 
provide services to the unbanked. An interesting example from the developing world is 
the Msanzi account in South Africa (annex 3). This is similar to the Universal Banking 
Services concept announced in the UK in August 2000
46, providing a cheap, ‘no frills’ 
bank account which should serve the needs of many who have been excluded from the 
formal banking sector. In many countries, the Post Office network has the best reach into 
the community, and can handle simple financial services effectively
47, leveraging off an 
existing branch network. Where there is no existing network, it may be possible to use 
part-time, or mobile units. 
 
In these cases, the efforts towards financial inclusion have mostly involved government 
and the commercial banks, rather than the central bank. But the commercial banks may 
not always be capable of participating effectively. A number of developing countries 
have large state-owned commercial banks with a good branch network but providing poor 
services to the population. But new private sector banks, including foreign banks which 
might be very interested in entering the market, are unlikely to want to offer services to 
the retail sector, at least initially, and probably never to the bottom end of the market. The 
normal focus of start-up operations will be trade finance (because it is short-term and so 
less risky than investment finance), cross-border payments and wealth investment and 
new banks are very unlikely to have large branch networks. 
 
There might be a gap in the market which the central bank can legitimately fill, for a 
period. 
 
It is useful to consider what services different groups might want from the banking 
system. The FinMark Trust initiative looks at four broad areas: transactions, savings, 
credit and insurance (the last of these being a product which can be sold through financial 
service outlets, but is not a banking function)
48.  
 
                                                 
45 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/8F9/37/pbr04_profininc_complete_394.pdf 
46 http://www.dti.gov.uk/postalservices/universal_bank.htm. “The intention is that this account should be a 
stepping-stone to financial inclusion i.e. over time users of Post Office card accounts will migrate to using 
bank account services provided by financial institutions.” 
47 If the Post Office or another similar institution provides banking services, there may be a question of how 
best to regulate it. Ideally, regulations should be no different to those for other banking institutions, so as to 
provide a level playing field; but the application of the regulations will need to take account of the nature of 
the business (typically, large volume, low value, low risk). 
48 The first three correspond broadly to Levine’s (JEL XXXV, 1997) five-fold description of the basic 
functions of a financial sector. 
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especially if there is no or only a limited commercial bank branching network – as noted 
earlier. But the central bank should be cautious about providing too much; and should 
probably consider charging appropriately for some services so that it is possible for the 
private sector to compete at a later stage. It is unusual for a central bank to take deposits – 
although occasionally this has happened (eg in Poland for a short period, where the 
central bank identified a market failure, and acted to stimulate the commercial banks to 
be more responsive). And the central bank should not become a lender, other than to the 
commercial banking system. 
 
Microfinance can provide a range of services, whether via specialist microfinance 
institutions, or via existing banks undertaking microfinance functions. Microcredit can be 
a very powerful tool. An IADB publication
49 notes that “microenterprises constitute 
more than 90% of all businesses in Latin America, employ over half of the labour force 
and produce approximately 20% of the region’s GDP”. Commercial banks will tend to 
focus on the larger companies, and may lack the know-how to deal with microenterprises. 
In many countries, microcredit is provided by non-profit NGOs with external funding. 
There is little need for central bank involvement if they are simply on-lending external 
funds, although it makes sense for a central bank – as part of its economic monitoring – 
to be aware of what such institutions are doing (volume of business, interest rates etc). 
But if the function is provided by a commercial bank, or if a microcredit institution wants 
to become a deposit-taking institution (whether to provide wider services, or to obtain 
funding for an expanding loan portfolio), the banking supervisor will need to be involved. 
 
The demand for microfinance extends beyond microcredit, to deposit taking (the Msanzi 
finance operations are a good example of this) and basic payment services. Here the 
banking supervisor must be involved, and needs to strike a balance between a light 
enough touch to allow microfinance to operate without being lenient in a way which 
would allow weak institutions to operate, with the risk of losing depositors funds. For 
some supervisors this will be new and unfamiliar territory. Guidance from experts, and 
material from eg www.microfinancegateway.org, may be very helpful. 
 
Governments will occasionally provide savings instruments for the population. This was 
the genesis of the UK’s National Savings; and even earlier – in the 18
th century – when 
the government issued annuities not so much to raise funds, as to provide a savings 
vehicle for a growing group of small-scale traders and entrepreneurs who wanted to save 
for retirement at a time when the market provided no (safe) alternative. This model can 
be seen in many developing countries today – for instance, India and Pakistan. In some 
cases, the schemes are used more by the wealthier part of the population which finds it a 
low-risk and relatively high-return investment, rather than the poorest sections of society. 
The central bank’s interest is more likely to be to ensure, as far as possible, that they do 
not interfere with monetary management
50.  
 
                                                 
49 “Principles and Practices for Regulating and Supervising Microfinance”, Jansson, Rosales and Westley, 
2004 
50 In Pakistan, lottery bonds – an equivalent of the UK’s Premium Bonds - are in the form of bearer bonds: 
as they have a significantly higher value than the highest denomination banknote, and have the additional 
benefit that they may yield a substantial return, they are used in some sectors as quasi-cash. 
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In many developing countries, banking and financial sector supervision is weak, external 
audits may be unreliable, and there is no deposit insurance system. While it may make 
good sense to encourage the use of the banking system for instance for savings, payment 
services and so on, there must be a risk that an individual institution will go bankrupt. 
The central bank should be cautious about advocating greater use of the financial system 
if it is not reasonably satisfied about its stability (see end of section 6). 
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8   Central bank governance and political economy 
 
“The function of governance [of public service institutions] is to ensure that an 
organisation or partnership fulfils its overall purpose, achieves its intended 




Regardless of the organisation, governance describes the collective behaviour of 
individuals within the organisation and how this behaviour impacts on stakeholders.  
Governance covers the way organisations, including central banks, are structured and set 
out the strategy to meet organisational objectives, adherence to legislation, level of  
operational effectiveness and the way risk is managed.  Good governance relies on the 
organisation and the individuals within it to have clear responsibilities, clear 
accountability, sound and ethical behaviour, and appropriate methods and frequency of 
communication.  In summary, it is about behaviour and relationships, and clarity. 
 
Public services should produce, either directly or indirectly, something of value when 
using public money. Governance describes the management structure which helps to 
achieve them. Public value includes: outcomes; services; and trust. For a central bank, 
these would normally be: 
 
•  Outcome – monetary and financial stability, and payment systems efficiency; 
 
•  Service – appropriate monetary policy decisions and implementation; banking 
and financial sector supervision; payment systems; financial data and analysis; 
 
•  Trust – the ability to sustain the above consistently over time in such things as 
low inflation expectations, trust in the national currency, low fear of financial 
sector bankruptcy, use of non-cash means of payment.  Trust is linked closely to 
accountability, transparency and disclosure. 
 
Central bank governance differs from that of private companies because of its public 
sector nature. A central bank is not just responsible to its owners – normally the Ministry 
of Finance – but more broadly to the population. The trend towards granting central 
banks autonomy from its owner is a reflection of this. If central banks are forced to 
respond only to Ministry of Finance demands, perhaps lending to government (monetary 
financing), or holding interest rates low in an attempt to reduce to government’s 
financing costs, the goal of monetary stability will be jeopardised
52. Autonomy for the 
central bank – assuming it is the banking supervisor – is important even in a largely 
                                                 
51 “The good governance standard for public services” – London, 2004. “Governance is dynamic: good 
governance encourages the public trust and participation that enables services to improve; bad governance 
fosters the low morale and adversarial relationships that lead to poor performance or even, ultimately, to 
dysfunctional organisations.” 
52 "In our case this commitment [to central bank autonomy] is borne of the understanding that monetary 
policy should not be subjected to the vicissitudes that necessarily confront ruling political parties." 
President Mbeki, South Africa, 2001. 
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financial sector stability will suffer
53. The population loses out if lack of autonomy leads 
to monetary or financial instability.   
 
Independence and accountability 
 
The balance between democratic accountability and freedom from short-termism can be 
tricky, and varies between countries. It affects setting of policy and its implementation; 
the choice of senior management; and oversight. For instance: 
 
•  In the UK the Chancellor sets the level of inflation which is to be targeted, 
while the Bank of England chooses which interest rate is necessary to 
achieve the target (instrument independence). The South African Reserve 
Bank operates in a similar way, with the Government setting a range for 
targeted inflation and allowing the central bank to determine the level of 
interest rates required to achieve this (South Africa also has a floating 
exchange rate). 
 
•  In the euro area, the law sets the broad goal of price stability, but  the ECB 
decides what level of inflation to target (constrained goal independence). 
Kenya has a similar structure: as with a number of other central banks, the 
law charges it with formulating monetary policy directed to ‘achieving and 
maintaining stability in the general level of prices’; and the central bank 
may announce an annual inflation target. 
 
•  In the US, the Fed chooses between an inflation and an economic growth 
target (full goal independence). The Reserve Bank of India appears to 
share a similar degree of independence, following a range of variables 
(inflation, the exchange rate, interest rates, economic growth) but without 
publishing specific targets for each. 
 
In most cases, the central bank is answerable to parliament rather than to the 
Government, making short-term political interference harder. 
 
•  For many developing countries with an IMF programme, there is a fourth 
variant: the IMF sets the target. In Sub-Saharan Africa, this is typically a 
narrow monetary aggregate target, in part because of concerns that a policy 
which allowed the central bank discretion might be more subject to short-term 
political interference. In other regions, such as Latin America, where data and 
the level of market development may be better, Fund programmes may 
support Inflation Targeting – which relies more on the inflation forecast than 
on monetary aggregate outturns. 
 
It is common to give security of tenure to the central bank governor (eg he/she can only 
be dismissed for gross misconduct), with appointments normally in the 5-7 year range. 
                                                 
53 For instance, I have seen cases in sub-Saharan Africa where political pressure has prevented the central 
bank from closing insolvent banks. Depositors suffer. 
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54. But lack of security of tenure erodes independence: 
one Western African central banker told me recently that his governor had no security of 
tenure, and “dances even before the [government] drum beats”, even though by law the 
central bank is independent. 
 
There is a lot of variation in the oversight structure of central banks. In the UK, non-
executive directors have an oversight function over the management of the central bank 
(16 of the 19 members of the Bank’s ‘Court’ are non-executives: appointed by but not 
representing the government), though they do not second-guess the monetary policy 
decision. But in the ECB and the US Fed Board of Governors there is no equivalent non-
executive oversight body
55, other than the European Parliament/Congress. 
 
In a number of developing countries, the Board combines the functions of oversight, 
executive committee, and monetary policy committee; and may well include at least one 
representative of the Ministry of Finance. Some small countries have argued that they 
need to include government officials in order to get the desired level of expertise – the 
argument is simply that with a small population, they need to double-up in some roles. In 
such cases, it is desirable that the government participant should at least participate on a 
personal basis, not as the mouthpiece for the Minister. But this can be hard to enforce 
unless there is political will to allow the central bank to be autonomous. As an example, 
the Central Bank of Guatemala is legally an autonomous institution, and the Monetary 
Council members must act independently. But the law (dated 2002) specifies the 
membership of the Council as the Governor, three Ministers of State (Finance, Economy 
and Agriculture), a member of Congress, and on a short-term basis three representatives 
of the economy (commerce, private banks, and a university). That said, the strength of the 
central bank’s research department puts the Governor and his team in a strong position in 
recommending and guiding policy. This may point to an area for donor support: 
strengthening economic analysis is a practical way of boosting real central bank 
autonomy. 
 
A World Bank working paper
56 suggests that: “Central banks are associated with better 
inflation outcomes in the presence of checks and balances [in the political system]…And 
the effect of checks and balances is enhanced in more polarized political environments.” 
If there is a dominant political party, the granting of formal independence to the central 
bank can easily be reversed, whether formally or informally. Where there is political 
contestation – ie a potential challenge to the governing political party – checks and 
balances will be more effective. Polarisation may be constituted by a strong political 
opposition; but empowerment of public opinion may serve the same purpose. To this end, 
transparency – central bank reporting to parliament rather than to the government; and 
publication and communication of good-quality economic analysis – should strengthen 
the effective independence of a central bank. 
 
All of these structures and relationships should be specified in law. If the law is to be 
changed, in terms of structures and relationships, the government may need to be 
persuaded to give up some direct control. IMF papers can be useful in supporting 
                                                 
54 The current governor of the Banca d’Italia will be the last to enjoy life-time tenure, something which 
arguably had removed democratic control. 
55 The individual Federal Reserve Banks do have non-executive directors. 
56 Keefer, Philip and Stasavage, David, "Bureaucratic Delegation and Political Institutions: When are 
Independent Central Banks Irrelevant?" (February 2001). 
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Framework”
 57. But it is important to recognise that governance is a ‘soft’ activity that 
works best when stakeholders observe the spirit as well as the letter of the law. 
 
Of course, there are risks associated with autonomy, and no governance framework is 
foolproof against individuals behaving badly or foolishly.  But if the central bank has 
been delivering its targeted outcomes and built a measure of trust (and central banks are 
often the most trusted public institution in the country), then it may be able to retain its 




In some countries, notably post-conflict countries where sensitivities remain about ethnic 
or political allegiances, the choice of central bank governor and senior staff must take 
account of the need to give reassurance to others that the central bank will operate in 
national, rather than sectarian interests. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the composition of the 
Board and senior management take account of ethnic and religious groupings within the 
country, although – helpfully – ethnic and religious differences are not institutionalised 
through any formal requirement for such groupings to be represented. In one extreme 
case – Bosnia – the constitution specified that the central bank governor, for the first few 
years, could not be Bosnian, because of continuing tensions between Croats, and Muslim 
Bosniaks and Serbs: the post was filled by a New Zealander, Peter Nicholls.  
 
Rather different sensitivities had to be managed in Liberia, where there was little trust in 
the basic honesty of national officials, and a programme (GEMAP – see box) was 
introduced to provide ex pat experts with co-signatory powers to co-manage key 
institutions, including the central bank. 
 
Liberia Government Agrees To GEMAP  
The Chairman of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), Gyude Bryant and the 
international community have agreed to implement the Governance and Economic Management Assistance 
Program (GEMAP). GEMAP is defined as a vehicle that offers international assistance so that well- 
intentioned and skilled Liberian officials will ensure that revenues are collected and spent transparently in 
line with the national budget. Key components of the GEMAP include financial management and 
accountability, improving budgeting, expenditure and procurement practice. GEMAP is also geared to 
establish effective processes to control corruption, support key institutions and train Liberian professionals 
to take over from expatriates. The mandate of the economic governance recovery program is expected to 
end in about two years after the seating of the new elected government. The Liberian Government finally 
agreed to sign and implement GE-MAP after pressure and threats from the international community to 
withdraw their assistance.  
Source: UNHCR Liberia Bulletin, September 2005  
 
Some have suggested that a GEMAP-type system is likely to be more successful when 
there are 15,000 UN soldiers on the ground to add authority to the approach. 
 
There is also debate about the appropriate structure for the central bank’s internal 
management. In the UK, the executive team (full-time staff) and the Monetary Policy 
Committee (who may hold academic, but not commercial, appointments at the same 
                                                 
57 http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2004/cdmfl/eng/lybek.pdf 
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58; and when the Bank was responsible for 
banking supervision, there was a separate group for supervisory decisions. In developing 
countries, where there may be fewer experienced officials, there is a case at least for 
allowing the possibility of differing groups and part-time appointments: for instance so 
that academic economists could input into monetary policy and banking experts (though 
not active commercial bankers, where there would be conflicts of interest) into 
supervisory decisions, without having to be involved in each other’s function or having to 
take on a full-time role in the central bank. But US officials, arguing on the basis of their 
own Board, will tend to argue for a single group of full-time staff to take all top-level 
decisions.   
 
Some central banks include in their boards representatives from different areas of the 
economy – industry, commerce, banking, law. In general this is to be avoided: they are 
unlikely to be experts in central banking, and may well face periodic conflicts of interest. 
 
Governance also touches on risk management.  Many central banks will rely on heads of 
function to know the risks they bear and the impact on the bank’s reputation and 
performance if risks crystallise.  Thus, many governance frameworks will include Audit 
and Risk Committees at the highest levels.  Often these are within the bank, at board 
level, to provide risk management oversight, supported by an independent internal audit 
department. Independence in the UK means Internal Audit reporting directly to the 
central bank Governor and/or Audit Committee.  Other central banks prefer to have 
external oversight.  This may be via the Government auditor (similar to our National 
Audit Office) as well as, or instead of, internal committees.  The requirement for 
independent financial scrutiny through recognised external auditors is usually enshrined 
in central bank law. 
 
Finally, though not a specifically central banking issue, many central banks still clearly 
struggle with gender equality, and are the worse for it. In some central banks, the 
governor, deputies and all directors/heads of department are men, a number of whom are 
clearly less competent than and rely heavily on the senior female staff in their 
departments. The failure to promote the most able people is undoubtedly detrimental to 




Is central banking in federal states different? For most purposes, the answer will be No 
for monetary policy, possibly for financial stability and probably in some other respects.  
 
A single currency requires a single monetary policy. There is no room for federalism 
here: that is true for the USA and Germany just as much as Argentina and Nigeria (and 
possibly Iraq). That said, if government is decentralised, it will be harder for the central 
bank to get a good picture of the impact of government transactions on financial sector 
liquidity: this is the case in Nigeria, for instance. And if regional governments can borrow 
money, and potentially run into debt problems, this may impact monetary and financial 
stability and so complicate the task of the central bank: this was a problem in Argentina. 
 
                                                 
58 Four of the nine members of the MPC are ‘external’: they have expertise in monetary economics, but do 
not have any executive or management role within the Bank. 
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obvious example of this. In most countries in any case, there is a single financial sector, 
requiring a single approach to supervision. 
 
High level management may reflect the federal nature of a country – for instance 
reserving some positions on the governing board/council for representatives from 
different states. This may be useful, particularly in post-conflict situations, to the extent it 
reassures different groups within the country that their interests will be taken into account 
at the highest level within the central bank. But institutionalising it could place 
constraints on recruitment of the best individuals. 
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9   Central bank laws 
 
Does the banking and financial sector legislation need to be re-written? In many cases, 
the answer will be Yes. But, as indicated in the previous section, amending legislation 
may have little effect without adequate political support for the changes to be 
implemented in day-to-day practice. 
 
Full re-writing of banking sector legislation will take some time; the task can be 
substantially supported by the IMF (the majority of such legislation is common across 
countries, and the IMF Legal Unit has a lot of experience), though local stakeholders 
should be actively involved in discussing drafts. In the interim – which may last for some 
years - there may be a case for making some amendments to existing legislation, for  
instance to establish the independence of the central bank’s monetary and banking 
supervision policies from government interference, and to ensure that  senior 
management has the legal authority to take necessary decisions and actions. If the 
government is likely to pass the requisite full legislative changes soon, it may be possible 
to operate on the new basis even before legal changes are made. For instance, the 
Monetary Policy Committee in Gambia started operating before the supporting revisions 
were made to the central bank law (due late 2005). 
 
Where there has been a significant regime-change – for instance, in post-conflict 
countries, or countries which have moved from an authoritarian to a democratic model – 
there may be a window of opportunity for introducing new legislation quickly. In Iraq, a 
new commercial bank law was introduced in September 2003, less than two months after 
the drafting was initiated; and the new central bank law passed in March 2004 was 
substantially ready some months earlier (but got caught up in political haggling). Without 
the support of the IMF legal team, and in more normal circumstances, this speed would 
not have been possible. New central banking legislation has been introduced in a number 
of other countries recently, including Afghanistan in February 2004. Laws can of course 
be amended as necessary – Nigeria’s central bank law of 1991 was amended in 1993, 
1997, 1998 and 1999. India’s dates back to 1934, with many subsequent amendments. 
 
Monetary stability  The monetary stability function of the central bank is essentially a 
matter for the central bank law. The key issues here are normally to establish clear goals 
for the central bank (see section 5, subsection on goals, and annex 1); to establish 
independence in the execution of monetary policy; and to prevent monetary financing
59. 
Without these, it will be hard for the central bank to deliver monetary stability and the 
benefits which accrue to all the population from this.  
 
Profits transfer  It is normal for central banks to transfer profits to the Ministry of 
Finance. This is one reason the government may gain some short-term benefit from 
inflationary financing: seigniorage revenue may increase in the short-term. But in the 
longer-term, inflation tends to harm central bank profits. At the extreme, people will stop 
                                                 
59 “The inflation caused by fiscal indiscipline is bad for income distribution.” John Williamson, “Did the 
Washington Consensus Fail?” November 2002. 
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government attempts to use the central bank to subsidise areas of the economy, or to buy 
government securities at below-market rates, are fundamentally misguided. They reduce 
central bank profits in the long-run, and therefore reduce transfers to the government – so 
that the government pays at the end of the day anyway – and in the process they tend to 
weaken monetary policy, push up inflation
60, and impair development of the financial 
system. However, problems can arise if the central bank is not allowed to transfer any 
profits to the government. In one country, the Ministry of Finance recently refused to pay 
interest on its securities held by the central bank because the new central bank law 
prohibited transfer of any profits to the Ministry: it was a sort of “tit-for-tat”, but with 
damaging consequences for the central bank’s balance sheet, monetary operations and 
financial market development (since the central bank at the time held a large portfolio of 
government securities). 
 
Financial sector stability and oversight  The laws governing oversight of banks and other 
financial institutions – commonly conducted by the central bank in developing countries, 
but not always – will be important in a number of respects. 
 
•  Independence: central bank independence is often discussed in the context of 
monetary policy – where it is certainly important. But it is also important in 
financial sector supervision
61. There have been many cases where the central 
bank has been unable to exercise the necessary level of supervision, including 
where appropriate closing a bank or other financial institution, because of political 
protection of that institution. If the central bank is to be able to protect the users of 
banks and other financial institutions, it must be independent from political 
pressure. 
 
•  Authority: Legislation does not always give a central bank the authority to restrict 
the operations of, or close, failing or risky financial sector institutions, even where 
there is no political pressure. Laws governing the central bank and commercial 
banks should be clear on this. 
 
•  Barriers to entry: It is important that banks and other financial intermediaries be 
properly licensed and supervised, to protect the public who use their services. But 
it is also important that authorisation and supervision should not place 
unnecessarily high barriers to entry. Especially in developing markets, there may 
be a number of simple functions which can be provided effectively by specialist 
firms, provided the central bank (or other supervisory authority) allows them to 
function without excessive capital requirements or bureaucratic demands. Such 
functions may include foreign currency exchange; money transfer – both within 
country and cross-border; and micro finance.  
 
                                                 
60 Central bank profits necessarily absorb reserve money and so impart a deflationary bias to the economy; 
transferring profits to government, which spends them, offset this. Conversely, a loss necessitates the 
expansion of reserve money to finance the central bank’s deficit. A healthy central bank balance sheet 
enables greater non-inflationary finance of a government’s deficit than can be achieved when the central 
bank’s balance sheet has been impaired. 
 
61 The case for this has been well made, inter alia, by Luca Papi of the San Marino central bank. 
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banks also to co-operate with their Ministry of Finance. An obvious case is the central 
bank’s lender of last resort function. If the central bank believes it necessary to rescue a 
failing bank – because of the systemic risk of not doing so – it is normal to ask the 
Ministry of Finance to cover any losses the central bank might incur. This clearly needs 
to be done by agreement! No Ministry would give an open-ended commitment to its 
central bank. 
 
Finally, if a radical change is being made to the purposes or operations of a central bank, 
then it will be valuable early on to formulate the new goals in simple terms, to discuss 
these with senior management, and to encourage senior management to focus their work, 
and that of the departments for which they are responsible, towards supporting those 
goals. Their teams are less likely to support the goals if they do not understand them. 
 
Commercial banking law is of course important to underpin sound development, but is 
beyond the scope of this paper, save to note that the commercial bank law should not 
discriminate between state-owned and other banks (some do); and should reinforce the 
authority of the central bank (or other supervisory agency). 
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10   Institution and capacity building 
 
It may be possible in a post-conflict situation to run the key policy decisions for a 
rudimentary financial sector with a handful of people. Non-national advisors and 
consultants can be very helpful, provided they have the appropriate expertise. But as 
analysis and policy develop, many more will be needed; and implementation of policies 
and provision of services will require large numbers of staff. This can only be done by 
using national staff; and will mean reliance on national management at most levels.  
 
If it is possible early on to identify a number of staff – both within the central bank and 
the commercial banks – who have the ability to work with new systems, these staff can 
be trained, both by use of short-term courses, literature, and to the extent possible by 
working alongside ex pat staff/consultants, so that they are fully involved in the 
development of policies and planning of systems. These are the people who will take 
over and run the financial sector. They need to understand and identify with (‘own’) the 
new systems and policies if those systems and policies are to be supported and developed 
in the future. Progress in reforming institutions is more rapid where ownership and 
commitment of the national authorities is strong. If the central bank’s senior management 
is actively involved in reforms, and has a sense of ownership, it is much more likely that 
reforms will move from paper into reality. 
 
It may be possible to identify nationals living abroad who might be prepared to return and 
support the development of their country. For instance, the central bank of Afghanistan 
recruited some 50 young Afghanis from universities in Pakistan, where their families 
were living and where they had studied economics and English
62. But such a tactic is not 
always possible. For instance, the Central Bank of Iraq cannot pay high enough salaries 
to attract trained nationals from abroad, not least given the security situation. And in 
Afghanistan, there was a degree of resentment from existing staff when the group of 
young staff was brought in at significantly higher salaries
63. But if these issues can be 
managed and the new staff integrated, this may be a very effective way of raising the 
skill-level of staff quickly
64. It contrasts with problems that can arise when aid agencies 
bid up salaries for skilled locals (skilled may mean: can speak good English and use a 
computer, but may include much more). “[In Afghanistan] there has been a brain drain 
from the managerial tier of the government to menial positions in the aid system.”
65 
Indeed, one problem the central bank is facing in retaining the recruits from Pakistan 
universities is that aid agencies are offering more attractive salaries, albeit for jobs which 
would not utilise their economic skills. 
 
                                                 
62 “While undergoing many hardships, Afghan refugees have also gained skills which make them a 
valuable resource for Afghanistan's reconstruction.” – World Bank report “Transitional Support Strategy – 
Afghanistan, March 2002. 
63 But at around USD1,000 a month, substantially less than foreign consultants, and in some cases more 
effective. 
64 In Afghanistan, USAID staff expected that half or more of the recruits would soon move on; but their 
training is not lost to the country, and this is accepted as part of the cost of building up a trained Afghani 
workforce. 
65 ODI Working Paper 253, September 2005: “Closing the sovereignty gap: an approach to state-building”. 
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migration to India, where the rewards – both financial and intellectual - may be much 
higher. In some of the smaller, new EU states, good staff may find the opportunities at 
the ECB, or in larger central banks, to be much greater than available at home. Well-
qualified staff in Central American central banks may find the academic opportunities in 
the USA more attractive than the possible career paths in their own central bank. Some 
response is possible: for instance, the Nepal Rastra Bank and others have made efforts to 
reduce overstaffing, notably cutting the numbers of unskilled and unproductive staff, and 
this should free resources which can be used to retain higher skilled staff. But as in the 
case of Afghanistan, this can create management issues when a small number of staff are 
paid substantially higher salaries than others; and will only be partially successful. 
 
Aid providers and consultants working with central banks in developing countries, and 
especially in post-conflict or otherwise fragile states, face some difficult dilemmas. When 
faced with limited resources, they may need to decide between firefighting and institution 
building. While in the long-term, institution building clearly makes sense, there is an up-
front resource cost involved. It may be felt that the time involved in training, or the risks 
of failure as responsibility is handed over, cannot be afforded
66. This certainly happened 
at times in Iraq in 2003-2004, where there was a risk of locking into a mentality of ‘need 
to deliver, no time to train’. Similarly, consultants may feel that they have to be able to 
demonstrate good output, rather than provide training which in the short term might not 
yield deliverables. Two consecutive consultants at one central Asian central bank wrote 
the bank’s Quarterly Bulletin with little regard to the work produced in their divisions, 
and without training the staff to be able to take over. Since consultants may have different 
incentives to aid providers, it is important for donors to monitor whether capacity 
building is actually happening. 
 
Institution building involves more than providing on-site expert advisors. The Bank of 
England’s Centre for Central Banking Studies
67  provides a wide range of seminars for 
central bankers, both in London and around the world; and there are a number of regional 
training institutes (see annex 5 for details on some of these). 
 
The provision of suitable literature can also be very helpful in training wider numbers of 
people
68.  
                                                 
66 “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach him to fish and you feed him for life.” 
But what if he will die of hunger before he has learnt? 
 
67  www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/ccbs/  gives a link to its annual Prospectus. 
68 Annex 6 lists the CCBS Handbooks in central banking, which have been written with the needs of 
providing practical advice to developing country central bankers in particular. A number are available in 
other languages (Arabic, Russian and Spanish). 
 
  46 
 
11   Donor co-ordination 
 
Donor co-ordination is important in many areas of post-conflict assistance. A recent IMF 
paper notes:  
 
“Co-ordination of donor technical assistance is often a major challenge in post-conflict 
countries. This is a challenge in all countries but is especially so in post-conflict 
countries, owing to the large number of TA providers involved…Co-ordination …helps 
avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the weak administrative capacities of post-conflict 
countries and ensures that technical and financial assistance in channelled in 
accordance with the priorities established by the country authorities.”  
 
But co-ordination does not always happen. A recent ODI Working Paper (see footnote 
26) notes that: “the uncoordinated accumulation of …changing rules and competing 
demands has let to a multiplicity of different reporting and procurement practices. 
Tanzania, for example, has typically had to prepare 1,200 reports a year for the aid 
system.” Similarly, on a recent visit to a Latin American central bank, we were told that 
30% or more of staff time in the central bank’s Economic Analysis Division was taken up 
by providing data for IMF and World Bank reports (including for the PSRP quarterly 
visits), and in some cases was delaying work on improving financial sector management.  
 
In some cases, the donor recipient needs to be better organised. “Albania’s experience 
illustrates the challenges of co-ordinating donor assistance and designing sequenced 
reforms that are tailored to local conditions…Integrating the multiplicity of processes 
proved institutionally complex, complicated in part by unclear responsibilities between 
the Ministries of Finance and Economy, and a fragmented approach to external 
assistance.
69” In some countries, there may be outright rivalry between departments: Iraq 
has experienced this recently, notably between the Ministries of Finance and of 
Economic Planning. 
 
It may well be the case that donors have different views on appropriate policy 
recommendations – what should be done, what are the priorities. It may not be possible, 
or even desirable, to reach a fully-agreed common position; but if conflicting advice is 
given, it will be harder for an inexperienced institution – such as a central bank 
developing very new (to it) policies – to judge which advice to follow, or to avoid the 
temptation to “cherry pick” (so losing the coherence of any overall plan), or even to 
accept advice as authoritative (possibly with justification). While new institutions clearly 
will need to learn – as part of the capacity building process – to form their own views, 
conflicting advice in the early days may force this to happen too soon, and could 
undermine even commonly-agreed donor advice.  
                                                 
69 2005 Review of Poverty Reduction Strategy Approach, IMF and World Bank August 2005. 
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Disbursement of donor funds 
 
Management of donor fund disbursement is also important. In many countries where the 
Ministry of Finance is reliant on donor funding, the central bank finds liquidity 
management difficult – the central banks in Malawi and Uganda have raised this recently, 
for instance. Disbursement of donor funds can be lumpy, and can lead to sporadic 
inflationary pressure, and/or exchange rate swings. It may also be directed to recurrent 
expenditures (especially if there are budgetary pressures on the government), so that if 
donor funding dries up, the government’s financing gap opens up and can cause pressures 
on monetary management. 
 
Donors may give foreign exchange to the government, which sells it to the central bank 
against domestic currency for disbursement – whether for projects or salaries, on or off 
budget expenditure. The expenditure increases domestic demand. In some economies, 
there is a large degree of capacity underutilisation, so that the boost to demand can result 
in more economic activity rather than in more inflation. In others, increased demand will 
lead to increased imports. Provided the central bank can re-channel the foreign exchange 
which it has purchased from the Ministry of Finance in a smooth way (for instance, via a 
foreign exchange auction), the additional provision of goods through imports will meet 
the demand without inflation. But some of the demand will be for goods or services 
which cannot be imported – housing, educational and medical services notably – and 
there may be an increase in inflation in these sectors
70. There may also be capacity 
constraints for some imported goods and services: not for small generators or satellite 
dishes, but possibly for heavy construction machinery or qualified consultants. 
 
The key issue here is the absorptive capacity of the economy. If demand is stimulated too 
fast, it will generate inflation and so push up the cost of the goods and services which 
donor money is buying. A more measured approach to spending will yield a better result 
for the recipients, and without the disruption caused by excess demand. The example of 
aid agencies bidding up the price of skilled labour in Afghanistan is a case in point. It is 
not the role of the central bank to organise donor co-ordination, or decide which 
expenditure should take priority in the case of temporary excess. That falls to the 
Ministry of Finance, or Ministry of Planning, or maybe to the government more 
generally. But the central bank should try to estimate the impact on the economy of 
additional expenditure. A standard approach would be to estimate the output gap
71 of the 
economy; this in itself may require capacity building, to improve statistics and analytical 
output, and could take years. In the meantime, a central bank should not respond to rising 
inflation in a knee-jerk fashion; it needs to be able to understand the causes of the 
inflation, and the consequences of action or inaction. 
 
                                                 
70 This has occurred recently in Afghanistan and Iraq, both economies with a lot of unused capacity, but 
which experience bottlenecks in certain areas. A stable exchange rate can support, but not guarantee low 
inflation since it does not constitute a demand-management tool. 
71 The output gap is the difference between the potential output of the economy – a function of 
manufacturing and agricultural capacity, training, infrastructure etc – and the actual output.  
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72 notes that “large-scale front-loading of aid disbursements 
(other than infrastructure) is costly as it pushes against the absorptive capacity 
constraints, intensifies the premium on skilled wages, bids labour away from the private 
sector (depressing growth) and incurs more serious Dutch-disease effects”. In this case, 
however, the study does note that a combination of good fiscal and monetary policies 
have succeeded in stabilising inflation and the real exchange rate despite heavy reliance 
on aid flows. Good outcomes are possible. (Aid-absorptive capacity may be particularly 
low in the first year of a post-conflict situation
73.) 
 
In principle, there have been a range of initiatives to strengthen donor co-ordination. “In 
keeping with the Monterrey Consensus, since 2002 the donor community, lead by the 
OECD-DAC and the multilateral development banks, has developed good practice 
principles for simplifying and harmonising donor procedures and changing aid delivery 
and management practices to enhance the effectiveness of aid.”
74 But the practice does 
not always follow. Where donor funds are channelled via the banking system, and where 
possible via commercial banks, there will be benefits from working with the central bank, 
and adopting a common approach to some issues: some broad measure of co-ordination, 
and common practices for disbursements (should they be in local currency or not? cash or 
non-cash? etc) can facilitate the central bank’s task. But donors may, and often do, 
disburse funds locally themselves, both in foreign currency  (and so possibly encouraging 
dollarisation) and in domestic currency, often in cash (normally at much higher cost than 
using non-cash systems). In some cases this is because donors are not familiar with non-
cash payment systems which may be available, or not familiar with the foreign exchange 
auction (if the central bank runs one). In all cases, it would be helpful if donors could ask 
the central bank about the best way of bringing funds into the country and disbursing 
them locally. Benefits that may accrue from working with the central bank include:  
 
•  Purchasing local currency for disbursements, rather than foreign exchange, will 
encourage the use of domestic currency; 
 
•  If purchases of foreign exchange are channelled through the banking system, or 
foreign exchange auction, it is easier for the central bank to obtain a picture of 
foreign exchange flows, and thus to plan ahead in managing any disbursements of 
foreign exchange to the market;  
 
•  Using non-cash payment systems, where available, encourages their use
75 and 
should reduce costs – cash handling is expensive, and raises security risks; 
 
•  Using non-cash payment systems creates a better audit trail. 
 
 
                                                 
72 “Absorptive capacity and achieving the MDGs: the case of Ethiopia”, Sundberg and Lofgren, March 
2005. 
73 Some work by Collier and Hoeffler supports this. 
74 2005 Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Approach: IMF, World Bank, August 2005. 
75 And wider use, by increasing volume, will reduce transaction costs and should thus make payment 
services available to a wider group of the population. 
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Summary and conclusions 
It is not normal for central banks to deal directly with individuals: they are above all 
bankers to the government and bankers to the commercial banks. This means that their 
impact on poverty alleviation, financial inclusion and economic growth more generally 
will tend to be indirect. Nonetheless, good central banking can be of significant benefit to 
all sectors of the economy, and particularly the disadvantaged, by providing a backdrop 
of stability which not only promotes economic growth, but also protects small-value 
transactions and savings against inflation and financial uncertainty which the 
disadvantaged in society are not well placed to understand. 
 
Inflation, interest and exchange controls, multiple exchange rates and directed lending all 
tend to be bad for the economy in general, and impact the disadvantaged in particular. 
They are often perpetuated because weak fiscal policy, exchange controls, multiple 
exchange rates and directed lending can be of great benefit to those who administer them, 
and facilitate corruption. 
 
The precise functions of central banks vary from country to country, and across time. But 
there are a number of core functions which apply to virtually all central banks. These 
include: 
 
•  Monetary stability: ultimately, this means getting inflation to a low level and 
keeping it there; and in many cases, especially in developing countries, involves 
stabilising the nominal exchange rate against an anchor currency (normally the 
US dollar, sometimes the euro or a currency basket); 
 
•  Payments reliability: both cash and non-cash payment systems should be 
available and trustworthy. If they are not, people will find an alternative; 
 
•  Financial sector stability: for most developing countries, this means the banking 
sector should be reasonably reliable. If not – as with payments – people will not 
use them. 
 
In many developing countries, central banks are overburdened with tasks which, while 
reasonable in themselves, are not appropriate to central banking, and the pursuit of which 
detracts from delivery of the central bank’s core purposes. These notably include: 
 
•  Holding down the cost of government borrowing, whether by monetary financing 
or by distorting the yield curve; 
•  The quasi-fiscal function of providing subsidies to ‘priority’ areas of the 
economy, via below-market interest rates. 
 
Sequencing and prioritisation 
 
Sequencing of reforms and modernisation is difficult to approach in general terms: much 
will depend on the starting point of the country, on its existing infrastructure and history, 
perhaps even on its geography. But a broad prioritisation can be attempted.  
  50Monetary stabilisation is the most important foundation to establish. This may be attained 
temporarily (or even long-term) by simply adopting another country’s currency, although 
the loss of freedom in monetary policy may be detrimental to the longer-term prospects 
for the economy, and could give rise to popular resentment (a domestic currency is often 
seen as an important symbol of nationhood and independence). Monetary stabilisation 
with a domestic currency involves a much wider range of issues: the printing of good 
quality notes; tackling the causes of inflation or currency depreciation (often a result of 
poor fiscal management), and the building of confidence in domestic institutions 
(primarily the central bank and the Ministry of Finance). 
 
The development of some form of non-cash payment network, if this does not already 
exist, may be next on the list together with banking supervision.  
 
Payments network: factors to consider here will include the relative importance of cross-
border transfers – both corporate (import and export finance) and individual 
(remittances); the existence or not of bank branch networks across the country; the 
availability of reliable electricity and communications networks (though these are not 
pre-requisites); the ability of banks’ accounting systems to cope; and possibly even a 
reluctance to use electronic systems which provide an audit trail, rather than cash. These 
may all need to be handled together: introducing an electronic payment system will have 
little impact if the population does not have an incentive to put its money into the banks 
and make use of the payment system; or if the banks have no incentive, or even negative 
incentives, to attract deposits or to provide such services to customers. Systems can, and 
should, be designed to facilitate financial inclusion; but this will not happen 
automatically. 
 
Banking supervision: if the economy is stable enough for economic growth to be seen, 
and for investment demand to appear, then monitoring and regulating the banking system 
will become increasingly important. Bank lending involves risks, and if these are not 
managed properly, or if they are undertaken recklessly or for corrupt reasons, depositors 
will lose money. But banking supervision is not an off-the-peg product (payment systems 
can be), and takes considerable time to develop. Again, financial inclusion can be 
encouraged and motivated, though it is not the role of the central bank to provide the end-
product to the population. 
 
As the monetary policy role and the financial sector develop, it is important to keep the 
central bank’s remit clear and to strengthen its authority. This may require changes to 
existing law. Useful models are available from the international institutions, but need to 
take account of existing legislation (bankruptcy law, company law etc).  
 
For central banking and financial sector development to be sustainable, capacity building 
is essential. While a small group of experts – perhaps even one or two able consultants 
with high-level support – might be able to drive central bank policy in the early stages of 
reform, the development and – importantly – implementation of good policies will 
require an increasing body of trained and motivated staff. Ex pat consultants cannot do it 
all; and would be too expensive even if they could. Building a strong cadre of local 
experts takes time, and requires careful management, but should be seen as a top priority 
in virtually all cases. It will require donor target-setting and monitoring if it is to happen. 
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a) areas which are visible to the public 
 
Cash: if a currency exchange might be appropriate, expert advice on how best to consider 
and manage such an exchange is invaluable
76. This is likely to be a one-off operation 
(albeit, potentially, of 2-3 year duration) where consultants can play a key role and 
capacity building may be less important.  
 
Non-cash payment systems: promoting a non-cash payment system is an important way 
of boosting financial sector efficiency and providing an audit trail (so discouraging 
corruption). But beware of consultants who recommend the most modern technology and 
top-level systems for an economy which is still largely cash-based: such systems can take 
years to build, and are expensive. Interim systems which can be introduced quickly and 
cheaply, and which will help to build familiarity with non-cash systems, should be 
considered first, while still planning for longer-term developments. A simple interim 
system which can deliver 90% of the desired benefits may be preferable to a sophisticated 
system which is likely to take years to build. 
 
Monetary policy: Support to central banks in developing and implementing appropriate 
monetary policies – to promote low inflation and currency stability - can help deliver 
enormous, if indirect, benefits to the whole population. But note that it is an area where 
the IMF may well be heavily involved; and it is worth being aware of their involvement, 
though there is no need to agree with their advice on all occasions. Indeed, central banks 
will benefit from economics training so that they can discuss policies with the IMF on an 
equal footing. 
 
The financial sector: banking services are not monolithic. When considering the needs 
for banking or financial sector development, it is important to take account of the 
immediate needs of the economy. If it is a banking network to support a payment system, 
this may be provided by existing banks which have little skill in other areas (credit 
assessment, investment, treasury management etc). But central banks need to be cautious 
about promoting increased use of the financial sector before banking supervision is ready 
to respond. The goals – a private sector financial system which can provide services to 
the public (including low-income people) and to companies, liberalised interest rates etc 
– should be clear; but an acceptably safe path towards them needs to be identified. One 
route might be to restrict growth of riskier business lines, while encouraging the 
development of service aspects (most obviously payment services and the provision of 
basic bank accounts). Banking supervision advice and training can be very important; but 
this necessarily involves a large number of people and takes time. Note that the UK’s 
FSA is not geared up to support this, as its legal remit does not include this type of work; 
but assistance may be available inter alia  from the Swiss-based Financial Stability 
Institute (FSI) founded in 1999 by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to assist supervisors around the world in 
improving and strengthening their financial systems. 
 
                                                 
76 “The Iraqi Currency Exchange”, Gray and Nell, published by Central Banking Publications, 2005 is good 
background reading on this.  There are also a number of IMF papers on recent currency exchanges in post-
conflict countries. 
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involvement. But if central banks are not aware of the issues, they will not be able to give 
support to Ministry of Finance or commercial bank efforts to improve the level of access 
to financial services. And some central banks could benefit from guidance on how they 
should treat schemes to promote financial sector inclusion: ignorance may result in 
blocking action, so that services cannot be provided; or lack of adequate supervision with 
a negative impact on the targeted sectors. Technical support for supervision could reap 
large rewards for the development of microfinance in particular. 
 
b) areas not visible to the public 
 
Central bank governance and political economy: as in other governance areas, the 
donor community increasingly appreciates that reform of central banks is not a purely 
‘technocratic’ exercise.  Detailed analysis is required to understand whether weak fiscal 
policy, exchange controls, multiple exchange rates and directed lending are designed 
deliberately for a political or corrupt end, or just reflect poor policy-making.  Donors 
need to understand this historical perspective better, in order to understand how to apply 
the lessons to current development challenges. ‘Modern’ central bank legislation provides 
for central bank autonomy; but the key point may be to support operational rather than 
legal independence. Board structures and the relationship with government will vary from 
country to country; but the goal of autonomy – delivery of monetary and financial 
stability – will be best delivered if the purposes of autonomy are clearly understood (at a 
political as well as central banking level), and central bank capacity is strong. 
 
Central bank laws:  central bank legislation does not have to be reinvented from scratch. 
The IMF legal department is a good starting point for new draft legislation, should it be 
needed. The ECB will also have some policy expertise, having recently scrutinised the 
legislation of new and applicant member central banks (though possibly from a policy 
angle – eg is the central bank autonomous – rather than detailed legislative approach eg 
does the power to close bad banks work?) Local input, through extensive stakeholder 
consultations, is essential, as the law has to be ‘owned’ by the central bank and 
government, and must be able to work technically in the local environment. 
 
Institution and capacity building: training and capacity building is essential if central 
bank reforms and development are to be sustained. This can be provided through 
seminars, on-site technical assistance, and written materials (the Bank of England’s 
CCBS is a major international provider here). Other notable providers of expertise 
include the IMF and World Bank and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS); 
various US authorities (the Federal Reserve Bank, the OCC for supervision, the Financial 
Services Volunteer Corp and USAID). The ECB and some EU central banks also provide 
some training and technical assistance.  Regional central banks which have recently 
undertaken certain reforms/developments may be well placed to offer assistance, and do 
so in many cases (eg a number of central European central banks). But it is important that 
any resident consultants really do mentor and train those they work with, and aim to 
make themselves dispensable. This needs monitoring! 
Donor and co-ordination: donor co-ordination touches on the provision of advice, and 
on the impact of foreign exchange inflows such as aid. But central banks do not always 
volunteer information on other providers of advice, so it is worth asking. As regards in- 
country currency movement, efforts should be made to use existing or newly-introduced 
non-cash systems, rather than bypassing them (as often happens). 
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The legal goals of a selection of central banks are summarised below. Some have a single 
primary goal, others have a range with no prioritisation. 
 
a)  Bank of England: 
 
Objectives:   In relation to monetary policy, the objectives … shall be: 
 
•  to maintain price stability, and 
•  subject to that, to support the economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government, 
including its objectives for growth and employment. 
 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Bank, the FSA and HM Treasury, 1997: The 
Bank will be responsible for the overall stability of the financial system as a whole which 
will involve: i) stability of the monetary system. …; ii) financial system infrastructure, 
…; iii) broad overview of the system as a whole.; iv) [Lender of Last resort functions]; v) 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the financial sector… 
 
b)  The Federal Reserve System 
 
Objectives:  The Fed was founded by Congress in 1913 to provide the nation with a 
safer, more flexible, and more stable monetary and financial system. 
 
Responsibilities:  The Fed’s duties fall into four general areas: 
 
•  Conducting the nation’s monetary policy by influencing the monetary and credit 
conditions in the economy in pursuit of maximum employment, stable prices, and 
moderate long-term interest rates. 
•  Supervising and regulating banking institutions to ensure the safety and soundness 
of the nation’s banking and financial system and to protect the credit rights of 
consumers. 
•  Maintaining the stability of the financial system and containing systemic risk that 
may arise in financial markets. 
•  Providing financial services to depository institutions, the U.S. government, and 
foreign official institutions, including playing a major role in operating the 
nation’s payments system. 
 
c)  The European System of Central Bank (ESCB) 
77  
 
Objectives:  The primary objective of the ESCB is to maintain price stability. Without 
prejudice to this goal, the ESCB also aims to support the general economic policies in the 
Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the 
Community as laid down in Article 2, which include a high level of employment and 
sustainable, non-inflationary growth. 
                                                 
77 The ESCB comprises the European Central Bank and the national central banks of EU Member States. 
 
  54 
Responsibilities:   
 
•  The definition and implementation of monetary policy for the euro area. 
•  The conduct of foreign exchange operations. 
•  The holding and management of the official foreign reserves of the euro area 
countries. 
•  The promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems.  
 
a)  Banco de Guatemala 
 
Objectives:  The fundamental objective of the Banco de Guatemala is to design and 
implement monetary policy to promote price stability, driving the economic development 




•  To issue the national currency. 
•  To strive to maintain an adequate level of liquidity in the banking system, through 
the use of pre-established measures in its Organic Law. 
•  To strive for the good management of the payment systems. 
•  To receive the banking special reserve in deposit and the legal deposits to which it 
refers in its Organic Law. 
•  To administrate the international monetary reserves, according to the guidelines 
that the Monetary Board dictates. 
 
a)  Reserve Bank of India 
 
Objectives:  To regulate the issue of banknotes and keeping of reserves, with a view to 
securing monetary stability in India and generally to operate the currency and credit 




•  Formulate, implement and monitor monetary policy. 
•  Regulate and supervise the financial system. 
•  Facilitate external trade and payment and promote orderly development and 
maintenance of foreign exchange market in India. 
•  Issue currency. 
•  Perform a wide range of promotional functions to support national objectives. 
•  Banker to the Government and to banks. 
 
b)  The State Bank of Pakistan 
 
Objectives:  The mission of the SBP is to promote monetary and financial stability and 
foster a sound and dynamic financial system, so as to achieve sustained and equitable 
economic growth and prosperity in Pakistan. 
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•  Issue of notes. 
•  Regulation of the financial system. 
•  Lender of last resort. 
•  Conduct of monetary policy. 
 
[and in practice include government debt management and support of the export sector.] 
 
c)  Central Bank of Nigeria 
 
Objectives:  The vision of the CBN is to be one of the most efficient and effective of 
the world's Central Banks in promoting and sustaining economic development.  It aims to 
be proactive in providing a stable framework for the economic development of Nigeria 
through the effective, efficient and transparent implementation of monetary and exchange 
rate policy and management of the financial sector. 
 
Responsibilities:   
 
•  Issuance of national currency. 
•  Maintenance of Nigeria's external reserve to safeguard the international value of 
its national currency. 
•  Promotion and maintenance of monetary stability and a sound and   
efficient financial system in Nigeria
78. 
•  Acting as banker and financial adviser to the Federal Government. 
•  Supervising and regulating banks and other financial institutions. 
 
d)  South African Reserve Bank 
 




•  Formulating and implementing monetary policy in such a way that the primary 
goal of the Reserve Bank will be achieved in the interest of the whole community 
that it serves. 
•  Ensuring that the South African money, banking and financial system as a whole 
is sound, meets the requirements of the community and keeps abreast of 
international developments. 
•  Assisting the South African government, as well as other members of the 
economic community of southern Africa, in the formulation and implementation 
of macro-economic policy. 
•  Informing the South African community and all interested stakeholders abroad 
about monetary policy and the South African economic situation. 
                                                 
78An April 2005 circular of the Nigerian central bank on the “Small and Medium Enterprises Equity 
Investment Scheme 1999” notes that: “The Scheme requires all banks in Nigeria to set aside 10 (ten) 
percent of their profit after tax (PAT) for equity investment and promotion of small and medium 
industries.” But CBN officials say that this is a recommendation only, and originated from the Banking 
Association, not the central bank. The appearance of direct controls may on occasion belie the truth. 
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ANNEX 2: Balance Sheet of a Central Bank 
 
Assets Liabilities 
Foreign exchange assets (net) 
Loans to government 




Cash in issuance 
Deposits from government 
Deposits from commercial banks 
Reserve requirements 
Capital and reserves 
Other 
 
A broad grasp of a central bank’s balance sheet can be useful in understanding the 
constraints it may face in practice. 
 
Where there are foreign exchange inflows – for instance from commodity sales (eg oil 
exporters when the price is high), or when non-residents buy state-owned assets that are 
privatised, or donor flows come in – then typically (i) the government sells the foreign 
exchange to the central bank (assets increase); (ii) the government’s deposit with the 
central bank grows (a counterpart asset to the assets increase); and (iii) when the 
government spends the money, cash in issuance and commercial bank deposits grow. 
Much the same thing happens if there are private sector current or capital account 
inflows, and there is an exchange rate target. The central bank buys some of the foreign 
exchange to prevent unwanted appreciation of the exchange rate, and there is a 
counterpart growth of commercial bank deposits. This is potentially inflationary – more 
money chasing the same volume of goods and services – prompting a central bank 
response. In sum, strong current or capital account inflows, while on the whole preferable 
to outflows, may put pressure on a central bank’s monetary operations. 
 
It is possible, as indicated above, that donor grants to a government may result in an 
increase in central bank foreign exchange reserves. Some of the foreign exchange which 
the central bank buys from the government will be re-sold to the private sector eg to fund 
imports; but some will be retained as a counterpart to expansion of the domestic money 
supply. This does not mean that the donor grant is wasted. If the government did not use 
its domestic currency, and spent USD or other foreign currency when making domestic 
payments, the money would clearly be used to purchase goods and services. If instead it 
swaps the foreign currency for newly-created domestic currency and uses this, the level 
of expenditure is exactly the same; but this time the central bank can provide domestic 
currency in suitable denominations, and earn seigniorage revenue, both of which benefit 
the economy. 
 
If the central bank lends to the government, again cash and bank deposits tend to grow 
when the government disburses the funds (the central bank balance sheet expands). Even 
when governments no longer borrow from the central bank, in many cases the ‘asset’ of 
lending to the government is not in a marketable form, effectively freezing part of the 
central bank’s assets and making monetary operations harder to undertake. 
 
In the case of financial instability, if a central bank bails out a commercial bank, it will 
have an ‘asset’ (loan to that bank) which is not usable, but which has a counterpart in 
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excess liquidity costs the central bank money. 
 
It can also be useful to consider interest earnings and costs. In underdeveloped markets, 
any central bank loans to the government are often at subsidised (low) rates; loans to 
banks in trouble are normally non-performing; and the return on foreign exchange 
investments is typically much lower than domestic interest rates. If there is excess 
domestic liquidity as a result of one of these three items, then the interest which the 
central bank needs to pay on its liabilities, to sterilise the excess, will tend to be higher 
than that earned on its assets, threatening the central bank’s balance sheet and 
constraining its operations. Profit and loss constraints mean for many central banks that 
they cannot simply sterilise excess liquidity: they may not be able to afford to do so.   
 
In some countries, the central bank’s accounts department may struggle with producing a 
good balance sheet, and it may be necessary to work with a rudimentary central bank 
balance sheet for a while. But it is better to obtain at an early date patchy data, but 
covering eg cash in circulation, banks’ balances with the central bank, foreign exchange 
reserves (cash held and any balances abroad), and government balances, rather than wait 
months and months for more complete data. The absence of one part does not preclude 
provision and use of the rest. 
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The South African example of collective commercial bank action to provide basic 
financial services to the low-income poor amongst the population raise a number of 
interesting issues, which are covered in the following news article. 
 
No profit from Mzansi, say banks (www. businessreport.co.za),October 26, 2004 
 
After much anticipation, Mzansi was formally introduced to the residents of Soweto, 
Khayelitsha, KwaMashu, Seshego and Port Elizabeth. Targeting low-income customers, 
seasonal labourers and the poor, Mzansi has been hailed as a watershed in the 
transformation of the financial services industry towards providing banking services to all 
South Africans despite their earnings. 
 
The eight participating banks - Absa, Eastern Cape's Meeg Bank, First National Bank, 
Nedbank, Old Mutual Bank, Peoples Bank, Standard Bank and Postbank - have spent a 
collective R25 million to R30 million to get the account off the ground. Another R10 
million to R15 million has been budgeted to cover marketing costs this year alone. The 
account carries no management costs and the banks have agreed to give Mzansi 
customers at least one free deposit a month. Charles Chemel, access initiatives co-
ordinator at the Banking Council, said this was the first of the Mzansi products. Next year 
an additional money transfer would be added to the account. 
 
By pooling infrastructure, banks have made 12 000 ATMs available. 
 
Johannesburg - South Africa's four biggest banks have stressed that they were not 
making any money on Mzansi, the national bank account launched yesterday. They 
have also reassured their existing customers that they would not be cross-
subsidising the account, which has been tailored for the poor. 
 
Absa managing executive of group flexibanking services Jenny Tyobeka said Absa 
believed it could break even within five years. Price increases on ordinary accounts 
would not be above CPIX, she said. "We will not be charging our existing customers 
more," Tyobeka said. Tom Boardman, the chairman of the Banking Council and chief 
executive of Nedcor, said he did not think any of the participating banks were expecting a 
profit in the short term. 
 
Tyobeka said it could have cost two to three times more if the individual banks had 
decided to go it alone. 
 
 But the individual banks' approaches to pricing may surprise clients expecting to get 
cheaper banking. Mzansi account holders will pay between R8 and R10.75 for cash 
withdrawals at the branches of the four commercial banks and Postbank branches, and 
between R5 and R10.75 for cash deposits made after the first free transaction afforded the 
account holders. Effectively half those charged for face-to-face branch contact, ATM fees 
are priced between R3.25 and R5 for cash withdrawals and between R4 and R10 after the 
first free deposit. Failed transaction fees of R1.25 to R2 will be levied. 
 
While a deposit of only R20 is required to open the account, some banks insist that the 
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 Although it was the "biggest tangible offering coming out of the financial sector charter 
process", the Association of Black Securities and Investment Professionals president 
Kennedy Bungane said it was only the beginning. "I believe that once a bank account is 
in the economic space, it will be tantamount to what an identity document is in the 
political sense.  
 
"Without an identity document, you are not part of the political mainstream of this 
country. Likewise, in the financial and economic system, without a bank account 
you are really not an active participant in the economy," Bungane said. 
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Commercial banks in developed countries provide a wide range of services. The most 
important services are likely to be: provision of a safe place to store money, and basic 
payment services – including in some cases cross-border payments. There may be very 
little demand for any sophisticated investment or savings products; and probably very 
little demand for loans which the banks can usefully meet. 
 
Section 6 notes that in cases of market failure, it may be appropriate for central banks to 
provide some services normally offered by the commercial sector – notably in the areas 
of cash handling and payments. There are others which a central bank might promote as 
‘priority’ functions, but should not itself undertake. This annex expands on some of these 
areas. 
 
Deposits   It is possible that in some developing countries there will be no banking 
system with a branch network. In some e.g. Somalia this may even include the central 
bank. Building vaults for physical security cannot be done in a few months, although it 
may be possible to repair old, damaged vaults. An alternative may be to use army bases 
(in developed countries these tend to be located away from population centres and so of 
less use; but in some countries they may well be situated close to population centres for 
control purposes).  
 
If there is a branch network with usable vaults, the banks can in principle be used for 
safekeeping of cash, though the central bank would normally only provide this service for 
government and NGOs. There are problems in promoting use of bank deposits: 
 
•  It may be the case that the bulk of the population has not used banks before. If 
wages are still paid in cash, and banks do not pay interest on current accounts nor 
offer useful retail payment services, individuals have little incentive to take their 
money to banks. Some may even fear it is risky to do so (people seen taking bags 
into banks may be assumed to be wealthy and so liable to extortion), or that 
bureaucratic procedures will mean it takes too long.  
•  If banks operate as safe boxes, depositors may be confident that money deposited 
will be available later when needed. But if banks make new loans – and 
particularly if they are pushed to make loans for political reasons (e.g. because 
the government thinks this will generate economic development) without having 
the skills to evaluate risk – they could hit liquidity or solvency problems, and 
prove not to have been a safe place to keep cash after all. If depositors are 
concerned about the risk of the bank being unable to repay, they will not deposit.  
•  In Afghanistan, many in the population ascribe the loss of value in bank balances 
due to hyperinflation with the banks themselves and so are reluctant to use banks 
even though the banks did not collapse. Some are confused in part by the 
redenomination during the currency exchange. A valuable deposit of Afs 100,000 
was made worthless by inflation, and in the currency exchange three 000s were 
removed. The loss is seen as a function of redenomination of bank accounts. 
 
Unless some of these obstacles can be overcome, so that people have sufficient positive 
incentives to deposit money in banks, a lot of money will be held in cash. This increases 
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around the country), and is economically inefficient. 
 
If salaries can be paid direct into bank accounts, rather than in cash, then individuals 
would need an incentive to take money out of the banks. If only by inertia, some money 
will be left on deposit, and this could help to start building familiarity with the system. 
Not all salaries can be paid in this way at once; but individual ministries, or departments 
of ministries, and of course the central bank itself, could make a start. This too would 
help in the familiarisation process; and if seen to work satisfactorily, demand would 
grow. 
 
Loans  Demand for bank loans might be subdued. There may be demand for micro-
finance – someone wanting to borrow $50 to start up a small business; but this may be 
handled most effectively by specialist microfinance units
79, or perhaps development 
banks, rather than the existing banking system. They should certainly not be provided by 
the central bank. There will also be demand for trade finance, notably from importers 
who expect to be able to make a quick turn-around and decent profit by importing goods 
in demand. But there may not be much demand for productive investment, or even for 
housing. Some loan demand will be met by the informal sector – family and friends 
lending to each other. But banks should not be pushed to make loans in the hopes that this 
will ‘get the economy going.’ Forcing loans will not (meeting genuine loan demand is a 
different matter); but it will distract attention from the more basic services banks could 
more usefully provide; and it could risk financial instability. 
 
Large state-owned banks are typically inefficient and have impaired balance sheets (too 
many non-performing loans to state-owned companies). It is common, and not 
unreasonable, to argue that they should either be recapitalised, reformed and privatised; 
or closed. This should not be done in a rush.  Recapitalisation makes them more 
expensive to potential purchasers, but does not improve efficiency or management 
capability. Reform by the authorities is likely to be less efficient that by the private 
sector, but in any case will take time. Privatisation cannot happen quickly, if only 
because of the difficulties of valuation. But closure might mean that important functions 
are lost to the economy. If there are no private sector banks, or none of any size, then the 
state-owned bank branch network may represent the only vault capacity in the country, 
and the only short-term basis for an interim payment system or support for a currency 
exchange. The banks cannot be closed before there is an alternative supplier of these 
basic services. But some changes can be introduced early on. For instance, any state-
owned banks could be placed under the management control of the Ministry of Finance, 
rather than under a range of different ministries (agriculture, trade, housing, industry), as 
this should at least reduce the scope for ministries using the banks for purposes which do 
not fit in with the overall budget, or central bank’s plans for financial sector reform. 
 
                                                 
79 These units could be in banks, or banks could be linked to/lend to NGO microfinance providers, e g as is 
the case with the Aga Khan NGO and bank in Afghanistan.  
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A range of regional financial institutions are listed below, with direct or indirect links to 
central banking and financial sector development more widely. Some of them have a 
clear and deliverable remit to provide training and build capacity in the region, using a 
mix of regional and international resources. Others have a more political goal, and may 
not deliver anything. The institutions focussed on currency union fall into the latter 
category, and include the AACB and WAMI in Africa. 
 
The Bank of England, and CCBS in particular, work with several of the training 
institutions, notably SADC and WAIFEM in Africa, CEMLA in Latin America, and the 




Association of African Central Banks (AACB): “Regional integration and cooperation 
seek to promote regional trade and economic integration through liberalisation 
procedures (current and capital accounts) and harmonisation of monetary and fiscal 
policies.”  Membership of the AACB is open to all African central banks; the AACB is 
an umbrella organization to foster cooperation and interaction between African Central 
Banks. Within the Association, there are five sub-regional groupings, representing the 
northern, central, eastern, southern and west African sub regions. One of its main 
objectives is the establishment of a common currency and an African Central Bank. 
 
APRM – African Peer Review Mechanism 
(http://www.dfa.gov.za/au.nepad/nepad49.pdf) – sponsored by NEPAD. 
ECOWAS – (www.ecowas.info) to achieve  economic integration and shared 
development so as to form a unified economic zone in West Africa
80. 
NEPAD - New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a vision and strategic 
framework for Africa's renewal. The NEPAD strategic framework document arises from 
a mandate given to the five initiating Heads of State (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, 
South Africa) by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to develop an integrated 
socio-economic development framework for Africa. The 37th Summit of the OAU in 
July 2001 formally adopted the strategic framework document.  
PEFA – Public Expenditure and Financial Management program (www.pefa.org). 
 
SADC (www.sadc.int) The SADC vision is that of a common future, a future within a 
regional community
81  that will ensure economic well-being, improvement of the 
                                                 
80 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo 
81 Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
  63standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social justice and peace and security 
for the peoples of Southern Africa. This shared vision is anchored on the common values 
and principles and the historical and cultural affinities that exist between the peoples of 
Southern Africa. 
 
WAIFEM (www.waifem.org): the principal objective of the Institute is to build capacity 




WAMI (www.wami-imao.org)– Mission Statement: “To establish a common central 
bank with a single currency for the economic prosperity of the West African Monetary 
Zone
83”. WAMI was set up in January 2001, as a transitional institution with a view to 
the creation of the West African Central Bank by 2003 (similar to the European Monetary 
Institute, which was the precursor to the European Central Bank). Other tasks of WAMI 
include sensitising the public and other stakeholders on the common currency, promoting 
consultations, discussions and meetings on issues falling within the competence of the 
Central Banks that affect financial institutions and markets in the member countries, 
encouraging the development and smooth functioning of the payments system, 
developing a macroeconomic database, establishing harmonised rules for the collection, 
compilation and distribution of statistics from member states relating to the monitoring of 
operations of the common monetary policy. [The staff has reportedly recently been 





SEACEN (www.seacen.org) South East Asian Central Banks84 (SEACEN) Research 
and Training Centre reviews and analyses financial, monetary, banking and economic 
developments in its constituent member countries and in the region as a whole. It initiates 
and facilitates co-operation in research and training relating to the policy and operational 
aspects of central banking. 
 
 Some countries have national, rather than regional specialised training institutes. In 
India there are The Institute for Development and Research in Banking Technology 
(www.idrbt.com) and the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research 
(www.igidr.ac.in).   
 
Latin America 
CEMLA – www.cemla.org – the Centre for Latin American Monetary Studies 
(CEMLA)’s mission is to promote a greater awareness of monetary and financial matters 
throughout the region by means of training, dissemination and research. In addition it acts 
                                                 
82 The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone 
83 The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone 
 
84 Ministry of Finance, Brunei Darussalam; Central Bank of China, Taipei; Reserve Bank of Fiji; Bank 
Indonesia; Bank of Korea; Bank Negara Malaysia; Bank of Mongolia; Central Bank of Myanmar; Nepal 
Rastra Bank; Bank of Papua New Guinea; Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas; Monetary Authority of Singapore; 
Central Bank of Sri Lanka; and Bank of Thailand.     
  64as Secretary to meetings of the region’s monetary authorities for the purpose of 
exchanging experiences and coordinating positions. 
CMC (www.secmca.org) is a grouping of Central American
85 central banks which aims 
to support regional financial development – such as strengthening central bank 
independence, free movement of funds within the region, a regional payment system and 







BIS – (Bank for International Settlements www.bis.org) contains a range of material on 
supervision and standards, as well as links to national central bank websites 
www.bis.org/cbanks.htm. 
 
DFI & DRI – (Development Finance International and Debt Relief International, jointly 
known as the Development Finance Group - www.development-finance.org): based in 
the UK. DFI handles all non-debt government and private sector development financing, 
as well as macroeconomic and poverty reduction analysis; DRI does a lot of work with 
HIPC countries to help with debt restructuring and sustainable finance.  
 
IMF – www.imf.org – which supports a number of regional training institutes for central 
banks, such as the JVI (Joint Vienna Institute). The IMF, together with donors, has 
already established technical assistance centers: 
 
•  PFTAC in the Pacific region (Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Center 
www.pftac.com); 
•  CARTAC in the Caribbean (www.cartac.com); 
•  AFRITAC in Africa (East AFRITAC in Tanzania and West AFRITAC in Mali); 
•  METAC (the Middle East Technical Assistance Center
86) in Lebanon. 
 
World Bank – www.worldbank.org 
 
 
                                                 
85 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic 
86 Covers Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, Syria, West Bank and Gaza, and 
Yemen 
 
  65ANNEX 6: Further reading 
 
The text of all CCBS handbooks can be downloaded from our website at 
www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/ccbs/handbooks_lectures.htm
These Handbooks are also available in Russian, Spanish and Arabic – see annotations  
(R) (S) (A) . 
 
Handbooks in Central Banking 
 
No Title  Author 
1  Introduction to monetary policy (R) (S)  Glenn Hoggarth  
2  The choice of exchange rate regime (R) (S)  Tony Latter  
3  Economic analysis in a central bank: models versus 
judgement  (R) (S) 
Lionel Price 
4  Internal audit in a central bank (R) (S)  Christopher Scott  
5  The management of government debt (R) (S)  Simon Gray 
6  Primary dealers in government securities markets (R) (S)  Robin McConnachie 
7  Basic principles of banking supervision (R) (S)  Derrick Ware 
8  Payment systems (A) (S)  David Sheppard 
9  Deposit insurance (R) (S)  Ronald MacDonald 
10  Introduction to monetary operations – revised, 2
nd edition  
(R) (S)  
Simon Gray, Glenn Hoggarth and Joanna 
Place 
11  Government securities: primary issuance (R) (S)  Simon Gray 
12  Causes and management of banking crises (R) (S)  Tony Latter 
13  The retail market for government debt (R) (S)  Robin McConnachie 
14  Capital flows: causes, consequences and policy responses  
(R) (S) 
Glenn  Hoggarth and Gabriel Sterne 
15 Consolidated  supervision  of banks (s)  Ronald MacDonald 
16  Repo of government securities (s)  Simon Gray 
17  Financial derivatives (s)  Simon Gray and Joanna Place 
18  The issue of banknotes 
(1) (s)
  Peter Chartres 
19  Foreign exchange reserves management (s)  John Nugee 
20  Basic bond analysis (A)   Joanna Place 
21  Banking and monetary statistics (A) (s)  John Thorp and Philip Turnbull 
22  Unit root testing to help model building Lavan  Mahadeva  and Paul Robinson 
23  Consumption theory  Emilio Fernandez-Corugedo  
24   Monetary operations  Simon Gray and Nick Talbot 
25  Monetary and financial statistics   Monetary and financial statistics Division 
 
(1) Withdrawn from publication. An updated version will be released in due course 
(A)  Available in Arabic ; (R)  Available in Russian;   (S) Available in Spanish 
  66Handbooks: Lecture Series  
 
No  Title  Author 
1  Inflation targeting: The British experience  William A Allen 
2  Financial Data needs for macroprudential surveillance - What are the key 
indicators of risks to domestic financial stability? 
E Philip Davis 
3  Surplus liquidity: Implications for central banks  Joe Ganley 
4  Implementing monetary policy   William A Allen 
5  Central banking in low income countries  Simon T Gray 
 
Handbooks: Research Series  
 
No  Title  Author 
1  Over the counter interest rate options  Richhild Moessner  
  67BOOKS 
The CCBS also aims to publish the output from its Research Workshop projects and 
other research.  The following is a list of books published or commissioned by CCBS:- 
 
Brealey, R, Clark, A, Goodhart, C, Healey, J, Hoggarth, G, Llewellyn, D, Shu, C, 
Sinclair, P and Farouk, S (2001), ‘Financial Stability and Central Banks — A global 
perspective’, Routledge. 
 
Capie, F, Goodhart, C, Fischer, S and Schnadt, N (1994), ‘The Future of Central 
Banking:  The Tercentenary Symposium of the Bank of England’, Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Davis, E P, Hamilton, R, Heath, R, Mackie, F and Narain, A (1999), ‘Financial 
Market Data for International Financial Stability’, Centre for Central Banking Studies, 
Bank of England.* 
 
Driver, R, Sinclair, P and Thoenissen, C (2005), ‘Exchange Rates, Capital Movements 
and Policy’, Routledge. 
 
Fry, M, (1997), ‘Emancipating the Banking System and Developing Markets for 
Government Debt’, Routledge. 
 
Fry, M, Goodhart, C and Almeida, A (1996), ‘Central Banking in Developing 
Countries:  Objectives, Activities and Independence’, Routledge. 
 
Fry, M, Kilato, I, Roger, S, Senderowicz, K, Sheppard, D, Solis, F and Trundle, J 
(1999), ‘Payment Systems in Global Perspective’, Routledge. 
 
Goodhart, C, Hartmann, P, Llewellyn, D, Rojas-Suárez, L and Weisbrod, S (1998), 
‘Financial Regulation:  Why, how and where now?’, Routledge. 
 
Gray, S,  Nell , J, (2005): A New Currency for Iraq, Central Banking Publications. 
 
Halme, L, Hawkesby, C, Healey, J, Saapar, I and Soussa, F (2000), ‘Financial 
Stability and Central Banks:  Selected Issues for Financial Safety Nets and Market 
Discipline’, Centre for Central Banking Studies, Bank of England.* 
 
Mahadeva, L and Sinclair, P (2002), ‘The Theory and Practice of Monetary 
Transmission in Diverse Economies’, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Mahadeva, L and Sinclair, P (2004), ‘How Monetary Policy Works’, Routledge. 
 
Mahadeva, L and Sterne, G (2000), ‘Monetary Frameworks in a Global Context’, 
Routledge.  (This book includes the report of the 1999 Central Bank Governors 
Symposium and a collection of papers on monetary frameworks issues presented at a 
CCBS Research Workshop.) 
 
*These are free publications which are posted on our website at www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/ccbs/publications/index.htm
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